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Abstract
Savage (1972) lays down the foundation of Bayesian decision theory, but
asserts that it is not applicable in big worlds where the environment is com-
plex. Using the theory of finite automaton to model belief formation, this
paper studies the characteristics of optimal learning behavior in small and big
worlds, where the complexity of the environment is low and high, respectively,
relative to the cognitive ability of the decision maker. Confirming Savage’s
claim, optimal learning behavior is closed to Bayesian in small worlds but
significantly different in big worlds. In addition, I show that in big worlds,
the optimal learning behavior could exhibit a wide range of well-documented
non-Bayesian learning behavior, including the use of heuristic, correlation ne-
glect, persistent over-confidence, inattentive learning, and other behaviors of
model simplification or misspecification. These results establish a clear and
testable relationship between the prominence of non-Bayesian learning behav-
ior, complexity and cognitive ability.
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1 Introduction
Many experimental and empirical studies have documented different behaviors of
belief formation that systematically differ from the Bayesian model,1 e.g., the use
of heuristics (Kahneman et al. (1982)), correlation neglect (Enke and Zimmermann
(2019)), persistent over-confidence (Hoffman and Burks (2017)), inattentive learning
(Graeber (2019)), etc. Informally, these departures from the Bayesian model are
often attributed to the complexity of employing the Bayes rule. However, to the
best of my knowledge, no study formally analyzes how the complexity of an inference
problem affects individuals’ learning behaviors. Are “abnormalities” less prominent
in less complicated problems? How do learning behaviors change with the complexity
of the inference problems? This paper aims to answer these questions and explain
different “abnormal” learning behaviors in light of complexity.
Every day we form beliefs over many issues to guide our decision making, from
predicting the weather and deciding whether to go out with an umbrella, looking for
chocolate in our favorite supermarket, to estimating and preparing for the impact
of Brexit. Some problems are trivial and some are complicated. Intuitively given
our limited cognitive ability, the complexity of the inference problem should affect
the way we form beliefs. After several trips to the same supermarket, we would be
fairly sure about where to look for chocolate; but even after collecting numerous
data points about the stock market, we rely on simple heuristics and often make
mistakes in our investment decisions.2 We are also more likely to disagree on compli-
cated problems, e.g., the impact of Brexit or global warming, but agree on simpler
problems, e.g., whether it is raining. Moreover, different individuals perceive the
complexity of a problem differently and are likely to form belief in different ways.
A leading macro-economist would estimate economic growth differently compared
to an ordinary citizen, and they are likely to disagree with each other even after
observing the same information.
To study the relationship between learning and complexity, I analyze a simple
model to compare the optimal learning behavior of an individual in small and big
worlds. The terms “small worlds” and “big worlds” are inspired by the seminal
work of Savage (1972). In his book, Savage develops the foundation of Bayesian
decision theory, but asserts that it is only applicable in small worlds but not in big
worlds. The latter refers to complicated inference problems where it is difficult for
individuals to form a prior belief on states and signal structures, or even to construct
the state space. Given this distinction between small and big worlds, different studies
have developed decision theories to model rational learning and decision making in
big worlds (Savage (1972), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995, 1996, 1997), Gilboa et al.
1There are plenty of examples, see for example the seminal work of Kahneman et al. (1982),
Kahneman (2011) and the section 3 of the review article Rabin (1998).
2See for example section 3.7.1 of Forbes et al. (2015) for the prominence and doubts of the use
of technical charting heuristics in financial market.
2
(2020)). This paper differs as I analyze rational learning in both small and big
worlds under the same model with finite automaton theory. This allows me to
disentangle the effect of complexity on learning from any arbitrary differences of
modeling choices. Moreover, in the existing literature, the distinction between small
and big worlds focuses on the differences in the complexity of the inference problem
but overlook the role of individual characteristics: a world could be big for some
people but small for the others.3 In contrast, this paper defines small and big worlds
based on the complexity of the inference problem relative to the cognitive ability of
individuals, and thus sheds light on the heterogeneity of learning behavior among
individuals.
More specifically, I consider a decision maker (DM) who tries to learn the true
state of the world from a finite state space, where the number of possible states N
measures the complexity of the inference problem. In each period t = 1, · · · ,∞, the
DM guesses what the true state of the world is and get a higher utility if he makes a
correct guess than otherwise. In each period after making a guess, he receives a signal
and updates his belief. To model limited cognitive ability, I assume the DM’s belief is
confined to a M sized automaton that captures bounded memory, as in the seminal
work of Hellman and Cover (1970).4 The DM’s “belief” is confined to one of M
memory states, and a belief updating mechanism specifies a (potentially stochastic)
transition rule that determines how he updates his belief from one memory state to
another given the signal he receives5, and a (potentially stochastic) decision rule that
determines his guess given his memory state. In contrast to the Bayesian model,
the DM has a coarser idea of the likelihood of different states of the world, and
the coarseness decreases in M . In other words, M measures the cognitive ability
of the DM. I define small worlds as cases where N
M
is close to 0 or in general very
small.6 In contrast, big worlds refer to cases where N
M
is bounded away from 0. As
previously mentioned, whether a problem is a small or big world depends on the
relative complexity of the world with respect to the individual’s cognitive ability.
I compare the characteristics of the optimal updating mechanisms that maximize
the asymptotic utility of the DM in small and big worlds. The results are summarized
in table 1. First, I analyze how learning differs from the Bayesian benchmark in
small and big worlds. This sheds light on whether and under what circumstances
the Bayesian model serves as a good approximation of learning behavior. I show that
3Intuitively, if individuals have super cognitive ability, any complicated problem would look like
a small problem.
4See Compte and Postlewaite (2012), Wilson (2014), Monte and Said (2014),
Basu and Chatterjee (2015), Chauvin (2019) Chatterjee and Sabourian (2020) in the Eco-
nomic literature that model belief updating and the aversion of complexity with finite automaton.
Also see Oprea (2020) and Banovetz and Ryan (2020) for experimental evidence.
5The Bayesian analogue of this bounded memory setting would be M equals the space of
probability simplex and the transition rule equals to Bayesian formula.
6Note that if the individual tracks his belief not with a finite automaton but with a real number
statistics. The cardinality of the belief statistics is much bigger than N and the model collapses
to a Bayesian model.
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Small Worlds:
low complexity relative
to cognitive ability N
M
Big Worlds:
high complexity relative
to cognitive ability N
M
Is learning close to Bayesian? Yes No
Is ignorance in learning “optimal”? No Could be
Is disagreement persistent? No Could be
Table 1: Differences in learning behaviors in small/big worlds
in small worlds, asymptotic learning behavior is very close to Bayesian, i.e., the DM
with bounded memory almost always makes the same guess as a Bayesian individual;
while in big worlds, asymptotic learning is significantly different from Bayesian and
the DM is bound to make mistakes. Moreover, he makes more mistakes when the
world is bigger, i.e., when N
M
increases.
From the first result mentioned in the previous paragraph, we know that learn-
ing is different from Bayesian in big worlds. But is it simply a noisy version of
the Bayesian model or does it resemble some of the well-documented biases? To
answer this question, the second result of this paper shows that in big worlds, it
could be optimal for the DM to never guess some states as he focuses on a subset
of states given his scarce cognitive resources. In contrast, such “ignorant” behavior
is never optimal in small worlds. This ignorance in learning encompasses different
well-documented learning biases including the use of heuristic, correlation neglect,
persistent over-confidence, inattentive learning, and other behaviors of model sim-
plification and misspecification. To see this, consider the phenomenon of persistent
over-confidence (Hoffman and Burks (2017), Heidhues et al. (2018)). Suppose the
state of the world comprises the DM’s ability and the ability of his teammate, where
both could be high or low. In the current setting, persistent over-confidence hap-
pens when the DM never guesses the state where his ability is low, and thus behaves
as if he always believes he has high ability and only updates his belief about his
teammate’s ability, even after observing a large sequence of bad team performance.
Similarly, other systematic learning biases could also be modeled as the individual
ignoring some states of the world.7 Such ignorance behavior could be optimal in
big worlds when N
M
is bounded away from 0, but in small worlds, the DM would
eventually realize he has a low ability.
Lastly, I analyze whether disagreements are persistent in small and big worlds.
As learning behaviors are close to the Bayesian model in small worlds, intuitively
individuals would always eventually agree with each other as they almost always
make the same guess asymptotically. In contrast, in big worlds, because individuals
with different prior beliefs and/or cognitive ability adopt different optimal learning
7I provide two example with the availability heuristic in section 3.1 and inattentive learning in
section 7.
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mechanism and could ignore different states, they could disagree with each other
even after receiving the same infinite sequence of public information. For example,
after observing a large sequence of bad team performance, two individuals with
persistent over-confidence would disagree on the assessment of their abilities: they
always guess that they have high ability and attribute the bad performance to the
other person. Moreover, in contrast to the existing literature that explains long-term
disagreement on the basis of differences in prior beliefs (Rabin and Schrag (1999))
or uncertainties in signal structures (Acemoglu et al. (2016)), I show a novel driving
force of disagreement: even when two individuals have the same prior beliefs and
observe the same infinite sequence of public signals with no uncertainties in signal
structures, they could eventually disagree with each other when they have different
levels of cognitive ability M .
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I will briefly discuss how
this paper relates to the literature. Section 3 presents the model setup. Then I
analyze the optimal learning behavior in small and big worlds in sections 4 and 5
respectively. Section 6 shows an extension of the model. Finally, in section 7, I
conclude by presenting a discussion of the results and more detailed connection with
the existing literature. Proofs and omitted results are presented in the appendix.
2 Literature
In this section, I will briefly discuss the existing literature and the contribution of
this paper, and will present a more detailed discussion in the conclusion after the
model setup and formal analysis.
This paper contributes to a growing set of theoretical literature that explains
behavioral abnormalities as optimal/efficient strategies of individuals with limited
cognitive ability. Sims (2003) and Mateˇjka and McKay (2015) study the implica-
tion of rational inattention and show that it explains sticky prices in the market
and micro-founds the multinomial logit choice model;8 Steiner and Stewart (2016)
shows that an optimal response to noises in perceiving details of lotteries leads to
phenomenon of probability weighting in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky
(1979)); Jehiel and Steiner (2019) and Leung (2020) shows that a capacity con-
straint on the number of signals individuals could update their belief with drives
confirmation bias and other biases in belief formation.
The closest to this paper is Hellman and Cover (1970) and Wilson (2014), which
study hypothesis testing and belief formation, respectively, using finite automaton in
a setting where N = 2. The former characterizes the optimal design of automaton,
8It is also interesting to note that under the setting of rational inattention, as shown in
Mateˇjka and McKay (2015), the individual never ignore any state if its prior probability is strictly
positive. In other words, ignorant behavior is never optimal and disagreement never happens with
certainty under the setting of rational inattention.
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while the later shows that the optimal automaton exhibits confirmation bias. This
paper differs from the two papers and existing literature in two aspects. First, the
research question is different as this paper analyzes how complexity and cognitive
ability affects learning and shows how the prominence of different learning biases
change with complexity and cognitive ability. In particular, as Hellman and Cover
(1970) and Wilson (2014) focuses on the setting N = 2, it is impossible to discuss
how complexity affect learning behavior.
Moreover, the existing literature proposes different explanations for different be-
havioral phenomena, while this paper explains a wide range of biases under the
same framework: efficient allocation of cognitive resources in face of complexity. In
particular, the results in this paper explain a large set of ignorant learning behav-
ior, such as use of heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman (1973)), correlation neglect
(Enke and Zimmermann (2019)), inattentive learning (Graeber (2019)), persistent
over-confidence (Hoffman and Burks (2017)) and other model simplification and
misspecification. It also micro-found assumptions in models of bounded rationality,
including misguided learning (Heidhues et al. (2018)) and analogy-based equilibrium
(Jehiel (2005)), and supports the theory of efficient heuristic in the psychology lit-
erature, (Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) and Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011)).
The results generate testable predictions of the prominence of these behavioral phe-
nomena: the prominence of these behavioral abnormalities should increases in the
complexity of the inference problem and decreases in the cognitive ability of indi-
viduals, which is supported in Enke and Zimmermann (2019) and Graeber (2019).
It is also worth contrasting this paper with the literature of rational inattention,
which offers a different model to capture limited ability. First, the theory of finite
automaton have been used in the existing economics literature to model aversion
of complexity (see Chatterjee and Sabourian (2020) for a review), and also receives
support in experimental studies (Oprea (2020) and Banovetz and Ryan (2020)). As
this paper aims to discuss the effect of complexity, It is thus more natural to model
limited cognitive ability using finite automaton, as it measures individuals’ ability
to handle complexity. In contrast, rational inattention captures the inability to
acquire information. Second, as shown in Mateˇjka and McKay (2015), in the setting
of rational inattention, individuals never ignore any states of the world, thus the
model cannot account for any ignorant learning behaviors. Moreover, as I show in
appendix E, in the setting of this paper, it could be optimal for individuals to ignore
some states even in a symmetric environment of it is complex enough, while in the
setting of rational inattention, the distribution of actions is necessarily symmetric.
Lastly, the results on asymptotic disagreement contributes to the large literature
that explains the phenomenon. In the existing literature, asymptotic disagreement
is driven by differences in signal distributions across states or differences in learning
mechanisms (Morris (1994), Mailath and Samuelson (2020), Gilboa et al. (2020)),
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the lack of identification or uncertainty in signal distributions (Acemoglu et al.
(2016)), confirmation bias (Rabin and Schrag (1999)), or model misspecification
(Berk (1966), Freedman (1963, 1965)).
Differently, this paper looks into the connection between limited ability and
disagreement, and show when asymptotic disagreement could arise and when it
will not happen, depending on the relative complexity of the inference problem.
Moreover, I show in proposition 4 that disagreement could arise solely because of
differences in cognitive abilities, even when two individuals share the same prior
without model misspecification, perceive signals in the same way, adopt an (almost)
optimal updating mechanism and observe a large amount of public information. To
the best of my knowledge, this novel mechanism that disagreement can be driven
by differences in cognitive ability has not been studied in the literature.
3 Model
I consider a world withN possible true states of the world, i.e., ω ∈ Ω = {1, 2, · · · , N},
and a decision-maker (DM) who wants to learn the true state. In each period
t = 1, · · · ,∞, he tries to guess what the true state is. Formally, in each period t,
the DM takes an action at ∈ A = Ω and for simplicity I assume he gets utility
u(a, ω) = uω > 0 if at = ω and 0 otherwise. The results hold for more general utility
function, as long as a correct guess yields strictly higher utility than an incorrect
guess, i.e., u(a, ω) > u(a′, ω) for all a′ 6= a = ω.9 For ease of exposition, I define
u = maxω∈Ω uω and u = minω∈Ω uω. The (potentially subjective) prior belief of the
DM is denoted as (pω)Nω=1 where
∑N
ω=1 p
ω = 1 and pω > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω.
In each period after taking an action,10 the DM receives a signal st ∈ S which
is independently drawn across different periods from a continuous distribution with
p.d.f. fω in state ω.11 I assume no signal perfectly rules out any states of the world:
there exists ς > 0 such that
inf
s∈S
fω(s)
fω′(s)
> ς for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω. (1)
I also assume no pairs of signal structures are the same, i.e., there are no ω and
ω′ 6= ω such that fω(s) = fω′(s) for (almost) all s ∈ S. This ensures that states are
9Roughly speaking, the results in small worlds obviously hold as the DM’s optimal behavior is
close to Bayesian that he almost always take the correct action. For big worlds, denote uωmin =
mina′ 6=a=ω u(a, ω) − u(a′, ω) for all ω, as the infinmum utility loss must be weakly greater than
a revised game in the baseline model where uω = uωmin for all ω, proposition 2 holds with more
general utility functions.
10The order, i.e., whether the DM receives a signal before or after taking an action in each
period, does not affect the result. The crucial assumption is that the action chosen by the DM at
each period depends only on his memory state, but does not (directly) depend on the signals he
received.
11For ease of exposition, I assume signals follow a continuous distribution but the results hold
with more general probability measures.
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Starts at memory state mt.
Takes action at ∼ d(mt).
Receives signal st.
Transits to memory state
mt+1 ∼ T (mt, st).
Figure 1: Time-line at period t given an updating mechanism (T , d).
identifiable. Given this assumption of identifiability, in a standard Bayesian setting,
the DM learns almost perfectly the true state as t becomes very large.12 In contrast,
I focus on the bounded memory setting that I will describe now.
The DM is subject to a memory constraint such that he can only update his
belief using an M memory states automaton. That is, in each period, his belief is
represented by a memory state mt ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}. Upon receiving a signal st in
period t, the DM updates his belief from memory state mt to mt+1 ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}.
An updating mechanism specifies a (potentially stochastic) transition function be-
tween the M memory states given a signal s ∈ S, denoted as T : M × S → △M ,
and a (potentially stochastic) decision rule d : M → △A. That is, given that the
DM is in memory state m and receives signal s, he takes action d(m) and transits
to memory state T (m, s).13,14
The time-line of a given period t is summarized in figure 1. Note that the DM
does not observe his utility after taking an action, thus uω is best interpreted as
an intrinsic utility of being correct. Otherwise, the problem becomes trivial as the
DM will learn perfectly the true state after observing a positive utility. This paper
analyzes the asymptotic learning of the DM, i.e., the DM aims to choose an updating
mechanism that maximizes his expected long run per-period utility,
E
[
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
u(at, ω)
]
.
An example of updating mechanism. Consider a simple example where
12See Blackwell and Dubins (1962).
13Note that the updating mechanism (T , d) is restricted to be stationary across all t = 1 · · · ,∞
to capture the idea of bounded memory. As discussed in Hellman and Cover (1970), a non-
stationary updating mechanism implicitly assumes the ability to memorize time, thus implicitly
assumes a larger memory capacity.
14Switching between multiple M memory state automatons requires more than M memory
states, as illustrated in appendix A. Appendix A also shows an example to illustrate that the
current setting allows switching between smaller sized automatons, e.g., three automatons with
M+2
3 memory states.
8
1 2 3 4
S1 S1 S1
S2S2S2
S2 S1
Figure 2: A simple updating mechanism with N = 2 and M = 4. S1 denotes the set
of signals where f 1(s) > f 2(s) and S2 denotes the other signals. The DM believes
that state 1 is more likely as he moves towards the higher memory states. The DM’s
actions follow the following rules: d(1) = d(2) = 2 and d(3) = d(4) = 1.
there are two possible states, i.e., N = 2, and four memory states, i.e., M = 4.
The DM has a uniform prior belief p1 = p2 = 0.5. For simplicity, assume all signals
are informative, i.e., f 1(s) 6= f 2(s) for all s. Figure 2 shows a simple updating
mechanism. The DM moves one memory state higher whenever he receives a signal
supporting state 1 where f 1(s) > f 2(s) and moves one memory state lower otherwise.
Moreover, his decision rule is such that he chooses action 1 if and only if he is in
memory state 3 or 4.
With bounded memory, instead of tracking his belief in the segment [0, 1], he
only holds a rough idea on how likely state 1 or state 2 are: he believes that state 1
(resp. state 2) is “very likely” if he is in memory state 4 (resp. memory state 1), and
“likely” if he is in memory state 3 (resp. memory state 2). When M increases, the
DM has more memory states to track beliefs and he would have a finer idea of the
likelihood of state 1 and 2. Moreover, by changing the transition function, the DM
essentially changes the way he learns. For example, if the DM moves one memory
state higher whenever he receives a signal s such that f 1(s) > 2f 2(s) but moves one
memory state lower otherwise, he is more likely to be in memory state 1 and 2 and
thus is “biased” towards action 2. 
Given state ω ∈ Ω, the sequence mt, together with some specified initial memory
state, forms a Markov chain over the signal space S. The transition function T
can be represented by a transition matrix between the memory states given a signal
realization s ∈ S. Denote qmm′(s) = Pr{T (m, s) = m′} as the transition probability
from memory state m to memory state m′ given a signal s, the transition matrix
given a signal s follows:
Q(s) = [Pr{T (m, s) = m′}] = [qmm′(s)] (2)
for m,m′ = 1, 2, · · · ,M where ∑Mm′=1 qmm′(s) = 1 and qmm′(s) ≥ 0 for all m,m′, s.
Taking the expectation over s, the transition probability matrices under state ω
follows:
Qω =
∫
Q(s)fω(s) ds. (3)
Denote µωm as the stationary probability that the DM is in memory state m when
the true state state of the world is ω, the stationary probability distribution over
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the memory states µω = (µω1 , µ
ω
2 , · · · , µωM)T is the solution to the following system
of equations:
µ
ω = (µω)TQω. (4)
Given the stationary probability distribution over the memory states, the condi-
tional probability of state ω given the DM is in memory statem equals pωµωm/
∑
ω′∈Ω p
ω′µω
′
m .
Thus it would be optimal for the DM to choose d∗(m,T ) = argmaxω′ u
ω′pω
′
µω
′
m .
Note that with slight abuse of notation, I often use action ω to denote action a = ω.
Given this optimal decision rule, I often refer the transition function T as the updat-
ing mechanism by implicitly assuming d(m) ∈ d∗(m,T ). Furthermore, for ease of
exposition, unless it is stated otherwise, I restrict attention to deterministic decision
rules throughout the paper.
Denote Mω as the set of memory states in which the DM takes action ω. The
asymptotic utility, or the long run per-period utility, of an updating mechanism T
is equal to:
U(T ) =
N∑
ω=1
[
uωpω
( ∑
m∈Mω
µωm
)]
(5)
and the asymptotic utility loss of an updating mechanism T is equal to:
L(T ) =
N∑
ω=1
[
uωpω
(
1−
∑
m∈Mω
µωm
)]
. (6)
The DM maximizes asymptotic utility or, equivalently, minimizes the asymptotic
utility loss associated with the updating mechanism. In the paper, I will mostly refer
the optimal design of updating mechanism as the minimization of L. In general,
with similar arguments in Hellman and Cover (1970), an optimal T may not exist.15
Therefore, the rest of the paper focuses on ǫ-optimal updating mechanisms that are
defined as follows. Denote L∗M = infT L(T ), i.e., the infimum asymptotic utility
loss given a memory capacity M . An updating mechanism T is ǫ-optimal if and
only if L(T ) ≤ L∗M + ǫ.
3.1 Small vs Big Worlds
In this model, N represents how complicated the world is while M represents the
cognitive resources/ability of the DM. This gives a natural definition of small and big
world problems based on relative (or perceived) complexity: an inference problem
is a small world problem when the complexity of the state space N is much smaller
15This is true because signals are continuously distributed. Roughly speaking, consider N =
M = 2, suppose the DM could improve his asymptotic utility by switching from m = 1 to m = 2
with signals that strongly support state 1, i.e., with large F
1(S1)
F 2(S1)
. For any set of signal realizations
S1 with strictly positive measure F
1(S1), F
2(S1), the DM can always find another set of signal
realizations S′1 with strictly positive measure F
1(S′1) and F
2(S′1) and higher likelihood ratio
F 1(S′
1
)
F 2(S′
1
) ,
thus improves his asymptotic utility.
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Small Worlds:
N
M
close to 0
Big Worlds:
N
M
bounded away from 0
Finite N At the limit of infinite M Finite M
At the limit of infinite N N = O(Mh) where h < 1 N = O(Mh) where h ≥ 1
Table 2: Definition of small and big worlds.
than the cognitive ability of the DM M , and is a big world problem otherwise.16
The formal definition is as follows:
Definition 1. The inference problem is a small world when N
M
is close to 0 and is
a big world when N
M
is bounded away from 0.
As N is finite in this baseline model, learning behaviors in small worlds refer to
the characteristics of the ǫ-optimal updating mechanisms at the limit whereM →∞
and big worlds refer to the the cases where M is bounded above.
In section 6, I analyze an extension of this baseline model where N → ∞. The
extension does not only pose a technical challenge but also has valuable economic
implications. In particular, it shows that both complexity and cognitive ability
affects learning behavior: the behavioral implications depend on N
M
instead of the
absolute value of M .17 I will present in details the setup and results in section 6
but it would be helpful to briefly discuss the extension in order to fix idea. More
specifically, I analyze a sequence of inference problems
{
(uωN , p
ω
N , f
ω
N)
N
ω=1
}∞
N=1
and
characterize the ǫ-optimal updating mechanism at the limit where N,M → ∞. In
the extension, whether a sequence of inference problem is a small or big world at
the limit depends on the divergence speed of N and M . When N goes to infinite
slower than M , at the limit N
M
→ 0 and the sequence of inference problems is a
small world at the limit; when N goes to infinite weakly faster than M , at the limit
N
M
is bounded away from 0 and the sequence of inference problems is a big world at
the limit. The results in the extension is qualitatively the same as the results in the
baseline model. The definition of small and big worlds are summarized in table 2.
In the subsequent sections, I will compare the learning behaviors, that is, the
characteristics of the ǫ-optimal updating mechanisms (for small ǫ) in small and big
worlds by answering the following questions.
Is learning close to Bayesian? The first question I ask is whether learning
behavior of the DM is close to that of a Bayesian individual in small and big worlds.
16It is important to define small/big worlds based on the relative size of the state space with
respect to the cognitive ability of the DM, instead of the absolute size of the state space. In
particular, if the DM can track his belief using the real number space, i.e., M is uncountably
infinite, then the model collapses to a standard Bayesian model and any inference problem with
countable state space is a small world problem.
17Note that it is difficult to derive comparative statics of learning behavior on N , as when N
changes, prior beliefs ,and thus the importance of identifying different states, also change.
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The answer to this question sheds light on how well the Bayesian model approximates
individual’s learning and decision making in different problems, which would give us
an idea on how robust theoretical results are to the setting of bounded memory and
under what circumstances the Bayesian model is a good description of individual
learning behaviors.
As we know, in the current setup, a Bayesian individual will (almost) perfectly
learn the true state of the world asymptotically, no matter how big N is. Thus this
question is equivalent to whether L∗M is close to 0 in small and big worlds.
Definition 2. The asymptotic learning behavior of the DM is close to Bayesian in
small worlds if and only if limM→∞L∗M = 0, and is close to Bayesian in big worlds
if and only if L∗M = 0.
Is ignorance (close to) optimal? Behavioral economics and psychology litera-
ture has documented different types of ignorant learning behaviors, including the use
of heuristics (Kahneman et al. (1982)), correlation neglect (Enke and Zimmermann
(2019)), persistent over-confidence (Hoffman and Burks (2017), Heidhues et al. (2018)),
ignorance of informational content of others’ strategic behaviors (Eyster and Rabin
(2005), Jehiel (2005, 2018)), ignorance of relevant variables (Graeber (2019)), or
other behaviors of model simplification or misspecification. These ignorant behaviors
are sometimes thought to be naive or inattentive, while sometimes viewed as efficient
given our limited ability (Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996), Gigerenzer and Brighton
(2009), Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011)).
Applying to this setting, these ignorant learning behaviors are equivalent to
updating mechanisms where the DM never chooses some action. As I assume an one-
to-one mapping from actions to states, the DM behaves as if he ignores some states of
the world. To see this, consider the classical example of availability heuristic. In the
experiment of Tversky and Kahneman (1973), the majority of participants reported
that there were more words in the English language that start with the letter K
than for which K was the third letter, while the correct answer is the reverse. The
proposed explanation is that individuals use availability heuristic: they pay attention
only to the easiness of recalling the two types of words but ignore the fact that it is
easier to recall words starting with K than words with K as the third letter. Define
ω1 as the event where there are more words that start with K and ω
′
1 as the event
where there are more words with K as the third letter, and define ω2 as the event
where the position of the K letter affects the readiness of recall and ω′2 as the event
where the position of the K letter does not affect recall probability. Define the state
space as {ω1, ω′1} × {ω2, ω′2}. In Tversky and Kahneman (1973), subjects observe
the easiness of recall as signals and they ignore the states (ω1, ω2) and (ω
′
1, ω2): they
infer whether ω1 or ω
′
1 is true while implicitly fixing ω
′
2. The formal definition of
ignorance is as follows.
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Definition 3. An updating mechanism ignores state ω if the DM never picks ac-
tion ω under all states of the world as t→∞, i.e., eitherMω = ∅ or∑m∈Mω µω′m = 0
for all ω′.
It is important to note that I define ignorance based on the DM’s actions instead
of his “beliefs”. It is because different from the Bayesian setting, the DM with
bounded memory does not track his belief for different states of the world but merely
transits between different memory states in M . Theses memory states do not have
to be associated with confidence levels of any of the N states.18 In particular, if the
DM never chooses a particular action ω, he has no incentive to track his confidence
level of state ω. Never choosing an action ω is thus effectively equivalent to ignoring
the possibility of state ω.
By definition, any updating mechanism is ignorant if M < N : if the DM lacks
the cognitive resources to consider all possible states, he has to be ignorant. In the
rest of the paper, I will focus on the more interesting scenario where M ≥ N and
analyze whether an ignorant updating mechanism could be ǫ-optimal for small ǫ in
small and big worlds.
Does disagreement persist among different individuals? The third ques-
tion relates to learning among heterogeneous individuals, in particular on whether
they will agree asymptotically. In recent years, polarization of ideologies have re-
ceived lots of attention in academia and the society. Despite the Internet has made
many information accessible, societies have become more polarized in both political
views and beliefs on global warming (McCright and Dunlap (2011), Flaxman et al.
(2016)). Understanding the mechanism behind persistent disagreement would help
alleviating disagreement on important issues.
As discussed after the definition 3 of ignorance behaviors, it is tricky and ar-
bitrary to define the distance of beliefs among different individuals with bounded
memory. Thus, I define agreement and disagreement based on actions. Two individ-
uals A and B agree with each other asymptotically if they choose the same action
under every state of the world as t becomes very large.
Definition 4. Two individuals A and B are bound to agree with each other asymp-
totically if and only if their actions aAt and a
B
t satisfy
lim
t→∞
Pr{aAt = aBt | ω} = 1 for all ω.
18While one could interpret that the DM transits between a countable subset of beliefs in the
N -dimensional probability simplex and always pays attention to his confident levels of all the N
states, I believe that this interpretation goes against the concept of bounded memory as it requires
unnecessary cognitive resources of the DM.
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They are bound to disagree with each other asymptotically if and only if
lim
t→∞
Pr{aAt 6= aBt | ω} = 1 for all ω.
And if limt→∞ Pr{aAt 6= aBt | ω} ∈ (0, 1), asymptotic disagreement happens
probabilistically. I study the question on whether individuals with different prior
beliefs (pωA)
N
ω=1 and (p
ω
B)
N
ω=1 but observe the same long sequence of public information
with eventually agree with each other. I also analyze whether two individuals who
start with the same prior but receive many private signals and have different abilities
of information acquisition (fωA)
N
ω=1 and (f
ω
B)
N
ω=1 or different levels of cognitive ability
MA and MB, will eventually disagree with each other in small and big worlds. The
latter investigates a link between disagreement and differences in cognitive abilities,
which contrasts with the existing literature that explain asymptotic disagreement
on the basis of differences in prior beliefs or uncertainties in information structures
among different individuals.
4 Small World
I first analyze the optimal learning mechanisms in small worlds where N
M
is small.
The following proposition shows that asymptotic learning behavior is close to Bayesian.
Proposition 1. In small worlds where N
M
is very close to 0, asymptotic learning
behavior is close to Bayesian, i.e., limM→∞L∗M = 0.
Proposition 1 shows that in small worlds, (almost) optimal asymptotic learning
mechanisms lead to behavior that is very close to a Bayesian individual, i.e., the DM
(almost) always takes the action matches with the true state. It thus suggests that
when the complexity of the inference problem is small, or when the DM’s cognitive
ability is high, his learning behavior could be well approximated by the Bayesian
model.
The proof of the proposition, along with other proofs in the paper, are shown
in appendix C. In the following, I roughly describe the proof by showing a simple
updating mechanism, illustrated in figure 3, achieves (almost) perfect asymptotic
learning as M goes to ∞. The proposed simple mechanism tracks only the DM’s
favorable action and the corresponding confidence level over time. At any period t,
the DM believes one of the N actions or no action is favorable, while the confidence
level, if he has a favorable action, is an integer between 1 and ⌊M−1
N
⌋. The memory
states could thus be represented by mt ∈ {0} ∪ {1, · · · , N}× {1, · · · , ⌊M−1N ⌋} where
memory state 0 stands for no favorable action. The decision rule is such that he
takes the favorable action if he has one, and randomly takes one of the N action
with equal probability if he does not have a favorable action. The transition rule is
described as follows.
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action 1
confidence
level
...
action 2
· · ·
...
· · ·
...
action N − 1
...
action N
with length
⌊M−1
N
⌋
Figure 3: A simple updating mechanism that achieves perfect learning in small
worlds.
First, the DM starts with no favorable action, i.e., the red memory state named
“0” in figure 3.19 If he receives a confirmatory signal for a state ω, he changes his
favorable action to action ω with confidence level 1; if he receives signals that is not
confirmatory for any states, he stays in the same memory state 0 that he has no
favorable action.
Second, suppose at some period t the DM’s favorable action is action ω with
confidence level K. If he receives a confirmatory signal for state ω, he revises
upwards his confidence level to K + 1 if K is not already at the maximum ⌊M−1
N
⌋,
and stays in the same memory state if K is at the maximum. Third, if he receives a
confirmatory signal for state ω′ 6= ω (thus against his current favorable action), he
revises downwards his confidence level to K − 1 with probability 1
δ
< 1 if K ≥ 2 ,
transits to the red memory state 0 with no favorable action with probability 1
δ
< 1
if K = 1, and stays in the same memory state with probability 1 − 1
δ
. Lastly, if
he receives signals that is not “confirmatory” for any states, he stays in his current
memory state with his favorable action and confidence level unchanged. This simple
updating mechanism could thus be interpreted as an learning algorithm that tracks
confidence level of only one state/action at a time, with under-reaction to belief-
challenging signals (captured by 1
δ
< 1).
The proof involves carefully defining the set of confirmatory signals for each
state, such that when the true state is ω, it is more likely for the DM to receive
a confirmatory signal for state ω than a confirmatory signal for any other states.
It also involves choosing a big enough δ such that it is more likely for the DM to
19The starting memory state has no impact on the stationary distribution over the memory
states and does not affect the asymptotic payoff.
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adjust upwards than to adjust downwards his confidence level. Crucially, with this
simple mechanism, when M
N
→ ∞, the upper bound of the confidence level goes to
infinite which means that the DM can record infinitely many confirmatory signals
for any state. Because asymptotically, the DM receives infinitely more confirmatory
signals for the true state than the confirmatory signals for the any other states, as
t → ∞, the DM should almost surely record infinitely many confirmatory signals
for the true state and thus almost surely learn perfectly the true state.
Now, as the DM learns perfectly for all states of the world, intuitively he has
no incentive to ignore any of the N states. In particular, the utility loss of any
ignorant updating mechanism is bounded below by min uωpω, while the utility loss
of the simple mechanism illustrated in figure 3 converges to 0 as M becomes very
big. Thus, all ignorant updating mechanisms must be outperformed by the simple
mechanism when M is big enough, which implies that ignorance in learning is not
optimal in small worlds.
Corollary 1. Given a finite N , there exists some M¯ such that if M > M¯ (e.g., in
small worlds where M →∞), there exists some ǫ > 0 such that no ignorant updating
mechanism is ǫ-optimal.
I now turn to the question on whether disagreement could persist asymptotically.
Consider two individuals A and B who have different prior beliefs (pωA)
N
ω=1 and
(pωB)
N
ω=1, or different abilities of information acquisition captured by (f
ω
A)
N
ω=1 and
(fωB)
N
ω=1.
20 As proposition 1 hold for all (pω)Nω=1 and (f
ω)Nω=1,
21 different individuals
will be bound to choose the same (optimal) action asymptotically if they adopt an
ǫ-optimal updating mechanism with very small ǫ.
Corollary 2. In small world where N
M
is very close to 0, different individuals with
different prior beliefs and/or information acquisition abilities are bound to agree
asymptotically in small worlds. That is, for all (uωA, p
ω
A, f
ω
A)
N
ω=1 and (u
ω
B, p
ω
B, f
ω
B)
N
ω=1,
as M →∞, if the two individuals adopt ǫ-optimal mechanisms with ǫ→ 0,
lim
M→∞
lim
ǫ→0
lim
t→∞
Pr{aAt = aBt | ω} = 1 for all ω.
Thus, corollary 2 shows that different individuals with different prior belief
and/or information acquisition abilities who adopt (almost) optimal updating mech-
anism are bound to agree with each other if they receive a large amount of (public
or private) information.
20For example, individualA could receive noisier signals than individual B, i.e., fωA = γ+(1−γ)fωB
for some γ ∈ (0, 1); or individual A could have different learning advantages, identifying some states
better but other states worse than individual B, i.e., sups f
ω
A(s)/f
ω′
A (s) > sups f
ω
B(s)/f
ω′
B (s) but
sups f
ω′′
A (s)/f
ω′′′
A (s) < sups f
ω′′
B (s)/f
ω′′′
B (s) for some ω, ω
′, ω′′, ω′′′.
21Note that I do not assume that individuals have the “correct” prior beliefs. As long as their
prior beliefs satisfy the full support assumption such that pω > 0 for all ω, proposition 1 and
corollary 1 hold.
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It is important and interesting to note that the assumption that the DM is
able to design and adopt an optimal updating mechanism is not as unrealistic as
one may think. In particular, there is a large set of updating mechanisms that
would achieve perfect learning and guarantee asymptotic agreement as M becomes
large. I illustrate this “robustness” result in the appendix D. Roughly speaking, I
consider the aforementioned simple updating mechanism illustrated in figure 3 but
assume that the DM mistakenly transits to a neighboring memory state with some
probability γ in each period regardless of the signal realization s: in each period
if the DM has a confidence level K where ⌊M−1
N
⌋ > K > 1, he adjusts upwards
or downwards his confidence level by one unit mistakenly with equal probability γ
2
;
if K = ⌊M−1
N
⌋, he adjusts downwards his confidence level by one unit mistakenly
with probability γ; if K = 1, he adjusts upwards his confidence level by one unit or
transit to no favorable action (the red memory state) with equal probability γ
2
; if he
has no favorable action, he changes his favorable action to action ω with confidence
level 1 with equal probability γ
N
for all ω; with probability 1− γ, the DM makes no
mistakes and follows the simple updating mechanism illustrated in figure 3.
Such local mistake could be induced by mistakes in the perception of signals or
imperfect tracking (local fluctuation) of memory states. Appendix D shows that the
results of (almost) perfect learning, i.e., proposition 1, and asymptotic agreement,
i.e., corollary 2, hold for all γ ∈ [0, 1). Local mistake, however likely it is, does not
break down the results of (almost) perfect learning and asymptotic agreement in
small worlds.
5 Big world
Now I proceed to the analysis of the big world and show that the three implications
in the small world, i.e., asymptotic learning is close to Bayesian, ignorance is never
optimal, disagreement does not persist, do not hold. Before I present the results, it
would be useful to discuss a simple example where N = M = 2, in order to illustrate
how bounded memory affects asymptotic learning and to introduce variables that
capture important features of an updating mechanism.
An example of N =M = 2. Suppose M1 = {1} and M2 = {2}, i.e., the DM
takes action 1 in memory state 1 and action 2 in memory state 2. An important
feature of the updating mechanism is the state likelihood ratios that measures how
likely the DM will be in a memory state m under state ω vs that under state ω′.
Definition 5. The state ω−ω′ likelihood ratio at memory state m is defined as µωm
µω
′
m
.
The higher the state ω − ω′ likelihood ratio at memory state m is, given that
the DM is in memory state m, the more confident he is that the true state is ω
instead of ω′. In this simple example, a good updating mechanism induces a high
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µ1
1
µ2
1
and a low
µ1
2
µ2
2
: the DM is confident that state 1 (resp. 2) is true when he takes
action 1 (resp. 2). In particular, perfect learning requires that the state 1 − 2
likelihood ratio goes to infinity at memory state 1 but close to 0 at memory state
2. In other words, the DM has to be almost sure that state 1 is true when he takes
action 1 and almost sure that state 2 is true when he takes action 2. However,
as will be shown below, this is constrained by the information structures and the
bounded memory. Intuitively, to be almost sure about state ω, the DM has to
have the ability to record/memorize almost perfect information supporting state
ω, either through recording one (almost) perfect confirmatory signal or infinitely
many imperfect confirmatory signal supporting state ω. However, in the current
setting the former is constrained by the informativeness of the signal structures, i.e.,
equation (1), and the latter is constrained by the bounded memory.
To illustrate this constraint, define the state ω − ω′ spread as follows.
Definition 6. Denote the state ω−ω′ spread as Υωω′ which is given by the following
equation:
Υωω
′
=
maxm∈Mω
µωm
µω
′
m
minm∈Mω′
µωm
µω
′
m
In this simple example, Υ12 =
µ1
1
µ2
1
/
µ1
2
µ2
2
and it has to go to infinite if the DM
perfectly learns the true state. However, I will now show that Υ12 is bounded
above, such that the DM can never be sure both when he takes action 1 and 2. In
an irreducible automaton, i.e., µωm > 0 for m = 1, 2, the probability mass moving
from m = 1 to m = 2 must be equal to the probability mass moving to the opposite
direction under both states. Suppose the DM updates his belief from m = 1 to
m = 2 given some signals S2 and updates in the opposite direction given some
signals S1, we have in the stationary distribution
µ11F
1(S2) = µ
1
2F
1(S1)
µ21F
2(S2) = µ
2
2F
2(S1)
under state 1 and 2 respectively. Thus,
Υ12 =
µ11
µ21
/
µ12
µ22
=
F 1(S1)
F 2(S1)
/
F 1(S2)
F 2(S2)
≤ l12l21 (7)
where l
ωω′
= supFω′(S′)>0
Fω(S′)
Fω
′(S′)
. This bound on the state 1− 2 spread, imposed by
the (maximum) informativeness of the signals and the bounded memory, induces a
trade-off between the inference the two states. Suppose l
12
l
21
= 100. If the DM
wants to design an automaton such that he chooses action 1 with probability 99%
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µ12
µ21
µ1
2
1−µ1
2
µ2
1
1−µ2
1
≥ 100
u1p1µ1∗2 + u
2p2µ2∗1 = L
∗
2
µ1∗2
µ2∗1
Figure 4: This example illustrates the trade-off between inference of the two states,
where l
12
l
21
= 100. The feasibility set of µ12 and µ
2
1 is shown as the gray area (which
may not include the boundary) and the infimum of utility loss is given by the point
where the objective function touches the feasibility set.
in state 1 , then
99
µ21
/
1
µ22
≤ 100
µ21
µ22
≥ 99
100
,
µ21 ≥
99
199
,
i.e., the DM has to make mistake in state 2 (chooses action 1) almost half of the
time. If however he decreases his quality of decision making in state 1 such that he
chooses action 1 in state 1 with probability 90%, then µ21 ≥ 9109 and he could make
mistake in state 2 with probability as low as 8.3%.
How much the DMwould trade-off between the inference of the two states depend
on the prior attractiveness of the two actions: u1p1 vs u2p2. When u1p1 is bigger
than u2p2, the DM is willing to sacrifice inference in state 2 to improve inference in
state 1. The trade-off is illustrated in figure 4. As I will show later, this trade-off
implies that ignorant learning behavior could be optimal.

The following proposition show that in the big world asymptotic learning is
imperfect, and significantly different from Bayesian. Combined with the results
in the extension (proposition 5 and 6 in section 6), it shows that what matter is
the ratio M
N
rather than the absolute value of M . Importantly, it shows that both
complexity and cognitive ability affects learning. Fixing the cognitive resources of
individuals, learning behaviors in a complicated problem, i.e., when N is large, are
more likely to differ from Bayesian learning compared to that in a simple problem;
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while fixing the complexity of the inference problem, learning behavior of a DM with
lower cognitive ability is more likely to differ from Bayesian learning.
Proposition 2. In big worlds where N
M
is bounded away from 0, asymptotic learning
differs significantly from Bayesian learning, i.e., L∗M > 0. Moreover, fixing N , L
∗
M
decreases in M , i.e., asymptotic learning becomes closer to Bayesian learning as M
increases.
Comparing proposition 2 with proposition 1 gives us the first difference of learn-
ing behavior in small and big worlds. In small worlds, asymptotic learning could be
well approximated by Bayesian updating; while in big worlds, asymptotic learning
behavior significantly differs from Bayesian updating. Moreover, the second part of
proposition 2 implies that fixing N , learning behavior gets closer to the Bayesian
benchmark when M increases, or equivalently when the relative complexity N
M
de-
creases.22 This “continuity” result implies that learning is close to Bayesian not only
at the limit of N
M
→ 0, but in general when N
M
is small.
To understand the intuition of proposition 2, it would be useful to revisit the
simple updating mechanism proposed in the small world (see figure 3), but the
intuition holds for any updating mechanisms.23 Different from the case of small
worlds, in big worlds, the range of confidence levels are bounded above for all states
of the world as M
N
<∞, as illustrated in figure 5. As M
N
is bounded above, no actions
could be allocated with infinite number of memory states. Therefore, the DM is not
able to record infinite (imperfect) signals supporting each state against the other and
thus will not be almost sure about his action. As illustrated in the simple example
where N = M = 2, when the DM is never almost sure about choosing action ω, it
implies that there is a positive probability that he chooses action ω in some state
ω′ 6= ω, which leads to utility loss. Thus L∗M > 0.
Next I show that different from corollary 1 in small worlds, ignorant learning
behaviors can be optimal in big worlds.
Proposition 3. In big worlds where N
M
is bounded away from 0, there exists some
ξ > 0 such that when pω < ξ and ǫ → 0, all ǫ-optimal updating mechanisms ignore
state ω, i.e., limǫ→0Mω = ∅ or limǫ→0
∑
m∈Mω µ
ω′
m = 0 for all ω
′ ∈ Ω.
On the other hand, suppose for some (uω
′
, pω
′
)Nω′=1, when ǫ → 0, all ǫ-optimal
22Note that it is difficult to directly compute the comparative statics with respect to M
N
because
when N changes, prior beliefs and the signal structures, i.e., the nature of the inference problem,
also change. The extension in section 6, however, clearly shows that the ratio M
N
matters for the
behavioral implication.
23Roughly speaking, for any updating mechanisms, Mω must contains finite number of memory
states for all ω. It thus takes only a finite number of steps to transit from Mω
′
to Mω, and
it happens with probability bounded away from 0. Put differently, the updating mechanism is
“noisy” and thus the DM can not be almost sure about choosing action ω.
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action 1
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action 2
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action N − 1
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length
Figure 5: The simple updating mechanism, revisited, in a big world and with differ-
ent range of confidence level across different actions. In particular, confidence level
of all actions 1, 2, · · · , N are bounded above.
updating mechanisms ignore state ω. Then for (u˜ω
′
, p˜ω
′
)Nω′=1 such that
u˜ω
′
p˜ω
′
u˜ω′′ p˜ω′′
=
uω
′
pω
′
uω′′pω′′
for all ω′, ω′′ 6= ω;
u˜ωp˜ω
u˜ω′ p˜ω′
<
uωpω
uω′pω′
for all ω′ 6= ω,
when ǫ→ 0, all ǫ-optimal updating mechanisms ignore state ω.
In a big world, as previously mentioned, the DM cannot allocate infinite cognitive
resources to every states of the world. As the DM is bound to make mistakes , he
thus faces meaningful trade-off in the allocation of cognitive resources as he trades
off between the probability of mistakes in different states of the world.24 Intuitively,
when the prior probability of a state is low, the DM would rather allocate cognitive
resources to infer about other states of the world and ignore that a priori unlikely
state.25 This result contrasts with Mateˇjka and McKay (2015) that studies decision
making in a setting of rational inattention as ignoring an action is never optimal in
their setting.
The optimality to ignore some state ω also depends the informativeness of the
24In small world, the DM can allocate infinite memory states to all actions. Adding or taking
away a finite number of memory states for each action thus does not affect stationary distribution
and utility. Thus there is no meaningful trade-off in small worlds.
25Note that the trade-off does not only happen in the allocation of memory states to Mω for
different ω, but also in choosing the asymptotic probability of taking different actions. More
specifically, a lower probability of choosing action ω,
∑
m∈Mω µ
ω′
m = 0, implies a higher probability
of choosing other actions.
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signal structures. In particular, as shown in equation (C.8) in the proof of proposi-
tion 3, if uωpω < uω
′
pω
′
for some ω′ and l
ωω′
l
ω′ω
, i.e., close to 1, then the DM must
ignore state ω. That is, the DM ignores states that are difficult to identified. He
rather saves his cognitive resources to learn other states of the world as the “return”
of allocating cognitive resources to identify state ω is small.
I also show in appendix E that ignorant learning behavior can be optimal even
in a symmetric environment where states and actions are ex-ante identical, i.e., pω,
uω and l
ωω′
are the same across all ω and ω′ 6= ω. To see the intuition, consider an
example where N = M . To consider all states, the DM allocates one memory state
to each action. It is thus easy for the DM to alternate between different actions and
unavoidably make mistakes. Put differently, the updating mechanism is “noisy”.
This is especially true when N is large as one memory state constitutes only a
small part of the automaton. If in contrast the DM ignores half of the actions, he
allocates two memory states to each of the actions he considers and he switches
between actions less frequently. It improves his decision making among the smaller
set of states that he considers. When N is large, the improvement outweighs the
loss he incurs among the states that he ignores as the loss is small to begin with, i.e.,
the asymptotic utility of a “noisy” updating mechanism that considers all states is
small.
Comparing proposition 3 with corollary 2 shows that ignorance in learning could
be optimal only in big worlds but not in small worlds. As mentioned in the
literature review (section 2), this explains different behavioral abnormalities, in-
cluding the use of heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman (1973)), correlation neglect
(Enke and Zimmermann (2019)), persistent over-confidence (Hoffman and Burks (2017)
and Heidhues et al. (2018)), inattentive learning (Graeber (2019)) and other behav-
iors of model simplification and misspecification. It also provides micro-foundation
to the equilibrium concepts proposed in Eyster and Rabin (2005) and Jehiel (2005).
Importantly, it provides a clear and testable predictions of under what circumstances
these behavioral abnormalities are more prominent: in big worlds where the com-
plexity of inference problems is high relative to the cognitive ability of individuals.
Now consider two individuals with different utility functions and prior beliefs
(uωA, p
ω
A)
N
ω=1 and (u
ω
B, p
ω
B)
N
ω=1, but receive a long sequence of public signal where
(fωA)
N
ω=1 = (f
ω
B)
N
ω=1 for all ω, or two individuals with the same utility functions
and prior beliefs, but receive private signals that are generated by different signal
structures, or two individuals with different utility functions, prior beliefs and signals
structures, etc. The following corollary shows that they might disagree with each
other with certainty as t → ∞ when they adopt an (almost) optimal updating
mechanism.
Corollary 3. In big worlds where N
M
is bounded away from 0, there exists some
(uωA, p
ω
NA, f
ω
A)
N
ω=1 and (u
ω
B, p
ω
B, f
ω
B)
N
ω=1 such that the two individuals are bound to dis-
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agree when they adopt ǫ-optimal updating mechanism with ǫ→ 0:
lim
ǫ→0
lim
t→∞
Pr(aAt 6= aBt | ω) = 1 for all ω.
The result is directly implied by proposition 3. As different individuals with
different prior beliefs and utilities would adopt different updating mechanism, they
could focus their learning on different subsets of states of the world. In particular,
consider an example with N = 4, if individual A ignores state 1 and 2 and individual
B ignores state 3 and 4, they will never choose the same action and thus disagree
with certainty.26 Comparing corollary 3 with corollary 2, we can conclude that
asymptotic disagreement only happens in big worlds but not in small worlds.
5.1 Disagreement driven by differences in cognitive ability
Corollary 3 shows that individuals could be bound to disagree asymptotically if they
have different utilities, priors beliefs and/or information structures. This subsection
shows that disagreement could also be driven by differences in cognitive ability. I
illustrate the result in the following simple example. Consider a setting with N = 3
and two individuals, A and B, who share the same prior beliefs and the same
objective signal structure:
p1 =
1
3
+ 2ν
p2 =
1
3
− ν
p3 =
1
3
− ν
(8)
sup
s
f 1(s)
fn(s)
= sup
s
fn(s)
f 1(s)
=
√
1 + τ for n = 2, 3
sup
s
f 2(s)
f 3(s)
= sup
s
f 3(s)
f 2(s)
=
√
1 + Υ where Υ > τ .
(9)
with 1 + τ ≥ 13+2ν1
3
−ν .
27 Moreover, to simplify things, assume u1 = u2 = u3 = 1. The
only difference the two individuals have is their levels of cognitive ability, where
MA = 1 and MB = 2. I present the following result.
Proposition 4. There exists ν, τ,Υ such that individual A and B adopting ǫ-optimal
mechanisms are bound to disagree for small ǫ, i.e.,
∃ν, τ,Υ, ǫ˜ > 0 such that lim
t→∞
Pr{aAt 6= aBt | ω} = 1 for all ω and ǫ < ǫ˜.
26Note that the result of disagreement continues to hold in a classic agree-to-disagree framework
where individuals observe each other’s actions. More specifically, one could re-define the signal
structures in the current setting to incorporate the information conveyed by the actions taken by
the two individuals.
27It ensures that if M ≥ 2, the DM never pick action 1 with probability 1 and he can achieve a
lower utility loss compared to the benchmark of no information.
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The intuition of the proposition is as follows: individual A always chooses action 1
as he has not enough cognitive resources to learn. On the other hand, when ν is
small enough, and when Υ is much bigger than τ , it is more beneficial individual
B to focus on learning state 2 and 3 as the signals supporting the two states are
more informative. As a result, he never chooses action 1 and thus never agrees with
individual A.28
Proposition 4 shows that even when individuals have the same prior beliefs and
the same knowledge about the signal structures, they can be bound to disagree
with each other after receiving a large amount of public information.29 This result
proposes a different channel of asymptotic disagreement that is in contrast with the
existing explanations that assume different individuals have different prior beliefs or
perceive signals in different ways.
6 Infinite N
In the baseline model where N is fixed and finite, it is difficult to analyze the
effects of a change in complexity N , as the prior beliefs and thus the importance of
identifying different states also changes with N . Thus, to show that the behavioral
implications depend on both N and M , and more specifically the ratio N
M
, instead
of just the absolute value of M , I analyze an extension where N,M → ∞ in this
section. In particular, the results in the baseline model hold in both small worlds
where N = O(Mh) with h < 1 and big worlds where N = O(Mh) with h ≥ 1.
More specifically, I consider a sequence of inference problems, characterized by
the utilities, prior beliefs and information structures,
{
(uωN , p
ω
N , f
ω
N)
N
ω=1
}∞
N=1
. The
subscript N highlights the fact that the utilities, prior beliefs and information struc-
tures could change along the sequence. I analyze first, whether learning is close
to Bayesian at the limit, i.e., whether limN,M→∞L∗NM = 0; second, whether a se-
quence of updating mechanisms {TN}∞N=1 that ignores some states at the limit
could be optimal when N,M → ∞; third, whether two individuals who adopt a
sequence of ǫ-optimal mechanisms could disagree with each other asymptomatically
as N,M →∞.
Before I present the result, it is necessary to present some extra assumptions
about the nature of the sequence of inference problems. First, I assume uωN ∈ [u, u]
28One may argue that after seeing individual B choosing action 2 or 3, individual A should change
his action. Note that however this is not possible as he has only one unit of memory capacityM = 1
and thus have to effectively commit to one action. In particular, one can generalize this framework
to which the two individuals also see each others’ action as signals and proposition 4 would still
hold.
29Note that although this example imposes strong assumptions in particular on the size of
bounded memory of individual A, it generates a strong form of disagreement in which the two
individuals disagree asymptotically with certainty. Similar intuition implies that even when the
assumption is relaxed, difference in M would lead to asymptotic disagreement at least probabilis-
tically.
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for some u > 0 for all ω and all N . Thus along the sequence of inference problems,
no states are infinitely more important than another state.
The prior beliefs of the DM satisfy following full support assumption:
Assumption 1. For any sequence of subset of states ΩN ⊆ Ω with cardinality |ΩN |
and a well-defined limit limN→∞
|ΩN |
N
,
lim
N→∞
∑
ω∈ΩN
pωN > 0 if lim
N→∞
|ΩN |
N
> 0. (10)
In other words, equation (10) ensures any sequence of subsets of states that has
a non-negligible measure in fraction at the limit, i.e., limN→∞
|ΩN |
N
> 0, also has a
non-negligible probability mass at the limit, i.e., limN→∞
∑
ω∈ΩN p
ω
N > 0.
30 A simple
example would be pωN =
1
N
for all ω and N .
Similar to the baseline model, I assume that there are no signals rule out any
states of the world: there exists ς > 0 such that
inf
s∈S
fωN(s)
fω
′
N (s)
> ς for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω and for all N. (11)
Finally, I make the following assumption about identifiability that plays similar role
to the assumption that fω 6= fω′ in the baseline model. It says that signal structures
with negligible Cauchy-Schwarz distances must have negligible probability mass at
the limit when N →∞:
Assumption 2. For all ǫ > 0, there exists some ξ > 0 and some sequence of subsets
of states Nξ ⊆ Ω such that limN→∞
(∑
ω∈Nξ p
ω
N
)
> 1− ǫ and
lim
N→∞
inf
ω,ω′∈Nξ ;ω′ 6=ω

− log
∫
fωN(s)f
ω′
N (s)ds√∫
(fωN(s))
2ds
√∫
(fω
′
N (s))
2ds

 > ξ,
Appendix B provides an example that satisfies assumption 2 and equation 11.
First I present the results in small worlds. The following proposition shows that
learning is close to Bayesian.
Proposition 5. In small worlds where N,M → ∞ and N = O(Mh) with h < 1,
asymptotic learning behavior is close to Bayesian, i.e., limN,M→∞ L∗NM = 0.
The intuition and the proof of the proposition follows similar arguments in propo-
sition 1. In particular, I show that the simple updating mechanism illustrated in
figure 3 achieves perfect asymptotic learning. Similar to the baseline model, in small
worlds, M
N
→ ∞: the DM could allocate infinite memory states to each state, and
30For example, it rules out prior beliefs (pω)Nω=1 such that p
ω = 1
N2
for ω ≤ N2 and pω = 2N−1N2
for ω > N2 , i.e., first half of all possible states have negligible probability mass at the limit.
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his confidence level for each actions ranges from 1 to∞. As the DM could be almost
sure about taking each action, he makes no mistakes asymptotically and he almost
always matches his action with the true state.
Next, as the DM can learn perfectly under every state of the world, he has no
incentive to ignore some states of the world to focus on a strict subset of states, i.e.,
ignorance in learning is not optimal.
Corollary 4. In small worlds where N,M → ∞ and N = O(Mh) with h < 1, a
sequence of updating mechanism {TN}∞N=1 is ǫ-optimal at the limit only if it ignores
at most ǫ
u
measures of states at the limit.
In particular, when ǫ→ 0, corollary 4 shows that the optimal updating mecha-
nism must ignore at most a negligible amount of states. To complete the analysis
in small worlds, the following corollary shows that different individuals are bound
to agree in small worlds if they agree on the probability 0 events.31
Corollary 5. In small worlds where N,M →∞ and N = O(Mh) with h < 1, dif-
ferent individuals with different prior beliefs and/or information acquisition abilities
are almost bound to agree asymptotically in small worlds if they agree on probability
0 events. That is, for all {(uωNA, pωNA, fωNA)Nω=1}∞N=1 and {(uωNB, pωNB, fωNB)Nω=1}∞N=1
such that limN→∞ pωNA > 0 if and only if limN→∞ p
ω
NB > 0 for all ω and N , if the
two individuals adopt a sequence of ǫ-optimal mechanisms with ǫ→ 0,
lim
N,M→∞
lim
ǫ→0
∑
ω
[
1
{
lim
t→∞
PrN{aAt = aBt | ω} = 1
}
pωNI
]
= 1 for I = A,B.
That is, they take the same action in almost all states of the world, measures in both
limN→∞(pωNA)
N
ω=1 and limN→∞(p
ω
NB)
N
ω=1.
Now I present the results in big worlds. First, the following proposition shows
that asymptotic learning is different than Bayesian.
Proposition 6. In big worlds where N,M → ∞ and N = O(Mh) with h ≥ 1,
asymptotic learning differs significantly from Bayesian learning, i.e., limN,M→∞ L∗NM >
0.
The intuition is again similar to the proposition 2 in the baseline model. In this
extension, similar to the baseline model, M
N
< ∞ implies that the DM can only
allocate finite number of memory states to almost all states of the world. Thus,
the DM might receive a finite number of signals that support the “false” states
and make mistakes after transiting to memory states that are allocated to an sub-
optimal action. As an example, in the simple updating mechanism illustrated in
31Note that in the baseline model, individuals necessarily agree on the probability 0 events as
pω > 0 for all ω. On the other hand, assumption 1 does not guarantee that: there may exists some
ω such that limN,M→∞ p
ω
NA > 0 but limN,M→∞ p
ω
NB = 0
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figure 5, the confidence level of almost all states must be bounded above and only
a negligible fraction of actions can be allocated infinite memory states. Therefore,
the DM will not be almost sure when he chooses almost all actions, and is bound to
make mistakes. Next, I show the analogue of proposition 3 about ignorance in this
extension.
Proposition 7. In big worlds where N,M → ∞ and N = O(Mh) with h ≥ 1,
all updating mechanisms must ignore almost all (measured in fraction) states at the
limit.
Note that the statements in proposition 3 and 7 are different. Proposition 3 says
that there exists some prior beliefs such that all (almost) optimal updating mecha-
nisms will be ignorant. In contrast, proposition 7 is “stronger”: for all prior beliefs,
all learning mechanisms, including the (almost) optimal updating mechanism, have
to be ignorant. Roughly speaking, the intuition of proposition 7 is as follows: when
M → ∞, the stationary probability on each memory state become infinitesimally
small. As the DM cannot allocate infinite memory state in almost all Mω, i.e., the
DM takes almost all action ω in a finite subset of memory states, he must picks
almost all actions with 0 probability.
To complete the analysis in the extension, the follow corollary shows that dis-
agreement could be persistent in big worlds, as in the baseline model.
Corollary 6. In big worlds where N,M → ∞ and N = O(Mh) with h ≥ 1, there
exists some {(uωNA, pωNA, fωNA)Nω=1}∞N=1 and {(uωNB, pωNB, fωNB)Nω=1}∞N=1 such that for all
ǫ, there exists some sequence of ǫ-optimal updating mechanisms {(TNA, dNA)}∞N=1
and {(TNB, dNB)}∞N=1 such that individual A and B adopting {(TNA, dNA)}∞N=1 and
{(TNB, dNB)}∞N=1 are bound to disagree:
lim
N,M→∞
lim
t→∞
PrN(a
A
t 6= aBt | ω) = 1 for all ω.
Note that corollary 6 is weaker than corollary 3 in a sense that there exists some,
but not all, ǫ-optimal updating mechanisms that lead to disagreement. The intuition
is as follows: as shown in proposition 7, the DMmust ignore almost all actions. Thus,
he obtains positive utility only under a negligible amount of states, and it implies
that a large set of updating mechanism could be ǫ-optimal. In particular, when the
prior likelihood of all states are infinitesimally small at the limit, e.g., pω = 1
N
, the
supremum utility equals 0 and all updating mechanisms are ǫ-optimal. It leaves
ample room for the individuals to adopt different optimal learning mechanisms and
thus leads to disagreement. Comparing corollary 6 and 5, we can conclude that the
same result in the baseline model holds qualitatively in this extension: asymptotic
disagreement will not arise in small worlds but could arise in big worlds.
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7 Discussion and Conclusion
Ignorant learning and heuristics This paper explains a wide range of behav-
ioral abnormalities under the same framework, i.e., efficient allocation of cogni-
tive resources in light of complexity. In particular, the results of ignorance be-
havior explain the inattentive/neglecting/heuristic learning behavior documented in
Tversky and Kahneman (1973), Hoffman and Burks (2017), Enke and Zimmermann
(2019) and Graeber (2019), and provide micro-foundation for the concepts of cursed
equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin (2005)), analogy-based equilibrium (Jehiel (2005)),
selection neglect (Jehiel (2018)) or misguided learning (Heidhues et al. (2018)). In
the following, I will discuss in details the connection of this paper with Enke and Zimmermann
(2019) and Graeber (2019).
Importantly, the comparison of small and big worlds illustrates a link between
the (relative) complexity of the inference problem and the aforementioned non-
Bayesian learning behaviors, which is supported by the experimental results in
Enke and Zimmermann (2019) and Graeber (2019). The former shows in section
2.4.3 that inattentive learning negatively correlates with the cognitive ability of sub-
jects and in section 3.1 that “an extreme reduction in the environment’s complexity
eliminates the bias”, while the latter shows that a reduction in the complexity of
the problem by removing a decipher stage of signals reduces inattentive learning
behavior.
Interestingly, Enke and Zimmermann (2019) and Graeber (2019) also shows that
simply reminding subjects about the neglected variables reduces inattentive learning
and improves inference. It seems to contradict the result in this paper that shows
inattentive learning could be optimal. However, this “reminder effect” could be in-
terpreted in the current setup via a change in the state space. Consider the behavior
of inattentive inference in Graeber (2019). The author shows that when subjects are
asked to guess the realization of a variable A, they often ignore the effect of another
variable B on the signal distribution. Applying to the setting in this paper, consider
that before being reminded about the ignored variable, the state state is supp(A)×
supp(B)×{B affects the signal distribution, B does not affect the signal distribution},
in which subjects might ignore the states that say “B affects the signal distribu-
tion”. After being reminded about the effect of B, the set of states of the world
reduces effectively to supp(A) × supp(B) × {B affects the signal distribution}, the
complexity decreases and subjects adopt another learning mechanism that might
not involve ignorance learning.
Future Research Directions The mechanism mentioned in the previous para-
graph brings forth an open question that is not answered in this paper. In reality,
individuals face different (sets of) inference problems and are likely endowed with
different learning mechanisms for different sets of states of the world. Like in the
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example mentioned in the previous paragraph, some states space could be nested in
another, and upon receiving some information that triggers the subjects to revise
the states space, they could transit from one learning mechanism to another. This
is also related to the question of how individuals construct the state space given an
inference problem. Arguably, there are infinitely many variables that might affect
the signal distributions, and their realizations could be incorporated in the set of
possible states. Roughly speaking, the result of ignorance seems to suggest that
individuals may only include the most “important” or “a priori probable” states,
while the “reminder effect” suggests that the construct of the state space also de-
pends on the information received by the individual. Moving forward, I believe that
the question of how individuals construct their perceived state space and the corre-
sponding prior belief deserves more in depth and careful analysis as it is fundamental
to individuals’ learning behavior.
Building on the results of this paper, another research question that is worth
pursuing is how complexity and cognitive ability affect learning in presence of ex-
perimentation incentive. In settings with experimentation, different from this paper,
the DM’s actions would affect his future learning via a change in the future signal
structures. There is an experimentation incentive that the DM takes an action not
only to maximize his utility in the current period, but also to influence his future
utilities as his action may improve or worsen the precision of future signals. When
the environment is more complex, or when the DM has lower cognitive ability, learn-
ing is less efficient in general and this may give the DM more incentive to opt for
instantaneous gratification instead of experimentation that yields long term bene-
fit. On the other hand, as learning is less efficient, the instantaneous gratification
is less satisfactory and the DM might be more patient to experiment. The overall
effect is thus far from obvious. Understanding better how complexity and cognitive
ability affects experimentation could help to improve insufficient experimentation,
to increase incentive to experiment and aid development of scientific reasoning skills
in educational settings (Zimmerman (2000)), etc.
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Initial
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13
(T , d)
(T ′′, d′′)
(T ′, d′)
Figure 6: An example of a 13-memory states automaton that involving switching
between three 5-memory states automatons. The DM starts at memory state 3 with
(T , d), and switch to (T ′, d′) and (T ′′, d′′) once he transits to memory state 1 and
5 respectively.
A Switching between different automatons
This section illustrates how the setup in this paper encompasses learning mechanisms
that involve switching between automatons with size smaller than M .
I first argue that assuming the DM could switch between multiple learning mech-
anism with M memory states implicitly implies that he has a larger memory capac-
ity than M . Suppose a DM starts with (T , d) at memory state m0 and switch to
(T ′, d′) and (T ′′, d′′) once he transit to memory state m1 and m2 respectively. As
(T , d) 6= (T ′, d′) 6= (T ′′, d′′), when the DM receives a signal s at memory state m
and decides to which memory state he transit to, or when he decides which action
he takes at memory state m, he has to remember whether he has once transited to
memory state m1 and m2. In other words, the DM has to track not only his current
memory states, but have to memorize the (incomplete) history of his previous mem-
ory states. Switching between multiple automatons thus implicitly implies a larger
memory capacity.
Now I illustrate by an example that a M memory states automaton could be
designed to involve switching between automatons with smaller sizes. The example
is illustrated in figure 6. In the example, the DM starts at memory state 3 with a
learning mechanism (T , d) that involves 5 memory states 1 to 5. Once he transit
to memory state 1, he switch to another learning mechanism (T ′, d′) that involves
5 memory states 1, 10, 11, 12, 13. On the other hand, once he transit to memory
state 5, he switch to the learning mechanism (T ′, d′) that involves 5 memory states
5, 6, 7, 8, 9. Thus, the proposed 13 memory states automaton can be interpretation
as a mechanism that involve switching between three 5 memory states automatons.
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Figure 7: Signal structures that satisfies assumption 1 and 2 as N →∞. The signal
structures comprise of low and high density alternatively in 2ω equal-sized intervals.
B Example of a sequence of signal structures that
satisfies equation 11 and assumption 2
In this section, I provide an example of a sequence of signal structures that satisfies
equation 11 and assumption 2. Consider the following (set of) signal structures
{(fωN)Nω=1}∞N=1 with S = [0, 1):
f 1N(s) =


2
3
for s ∈ [ i
21
, i+1
21
) where i = 0
4
3
for s ∈ [ i
21
, i+1
21
) where i = 1
fωN(s) =


2
3
for s ∈ [ i
2ω
, i+1
2ω
) where i = 0, 2, · · · , 2ω − 2
4
3
for s ∈ [ i
2ω
, i+1
2ω
) where i = 1, 3, · · · , 2ω − 1
The signal structures are illustrated in figure 7. First, it satisfies equation 11 as
fωN (s)
fω
′
N (s)
≥ 1
2
for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω, N and s. Second, given any ω and ω′ 6= ω and for any
N , the Cauchy-Schwarz distance is equal to:
− log
∫
fωN(s)f
ω′
N (s)ds√∫
(fωN(s))
2ds
√∫
(fω
′
N (s))
2ds
=− log
1
4
(2
3
)2 + 1
2
2
3
4
3
+ 1
4
(4
3
)2
1
2
(2
3
)2 + 1
2
(4
3
)2
=− log 1
10/9
> 1 + ξ
where ξ < log 10
9
− 1 and thus satisfies assumption 2.
35
C Proofs
C.1 Proof of proposition 1
Proof. Before I prove the proposition, I present and prove the following lemma. With
slight abuse of notations, I use F to denote the probability mass on any lotteries
of signals, i.e., for any lotteries of signal S ′ =
∑
s g(s) × s where g ∈ △(S ∪ {∅}),
F ω(S ′) ≡ ∫ fω(s′)g(s′) ds′.
Lemma C.1. There exists δ > 1 and a set of lotteries of signals {Sω}Nω=1 such that
δF ω(Sω
′
)∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω(Sω′′)
> 1 for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω;
δF ω(Sω)∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω(Sω′′)
>
δF ω(Sω
′
)∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω(Sω′′)
for all ω ∈ Ω and ω′ 6= ω.
(C.1)
Moreover if (δ, {Sω}Nω=1) satisfies equation (C.1), (δ, {S ′ω}Nω=1) where S ′ω = β ×
{S ′ω}+ (1− β)× {∅} also satisfies equation (C.1) for all β ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. First, note that δ does not affect the second inequality. Thus, for all ω and
ω′ such that F ω(Sω
′
N ) > 0, there always exists a big enough δ that satisfies the first
inequality.
I proceed to show that there exists a set of lotteries of signals {Sω}Nω=1 such that
F ω(Sω
′
) > 0 for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω and satisfies the second inequality. Note that
δF ω(Sω)∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω(Sω′′)
>
δF ω(Sω
′
)∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω(Sω′′)
⇐⇒ F ω(Sω) > F ω(Sfω′).
Denote A ≡ min
{
1,minω
√∫
(fω(s))2 ds
∫
(fω(s))2 ds
}
and consider32
Sω =
∑
s∈S

 Afω(s)√∫
(fω(s))2ds
× s

 +
(
1− A
√∫
(fω(s))2ds
)
× ∅, (C.2)
i.e., a random lottery that put mass
Afω(s)√∫
(fω(s))2ds
on each signal s and the remain-
ing probability on the empty set. We have
F ω(Sω) =
A
∫
(fω(s))2ds√∫
(fω(s))2ds
= A
√∫
(fω(s))2ds >
A
∫
fω(s)fω
′
(s)ds√∫
(fω′(s))2ds
= F ω(Sω
′
)
32Note that the choice of A is only to ensure that the probabilities in the random lottery of
signal Sω sum up to be 1. In particular, it does not affect the subsequent proof and the stationary
probability distribution among memory states, as will be shown in the second part of the lemma C.1.
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a1
a2
a3
a4
Figure 8: This figure illustrate a “star” updating mechanism with 4 actions. In the
central (red) memory state, the DM randomly chooses one of the 4 actions. There
are 4 equiv-length branches that correspond to each of the 4 actions.
where the inequality is given by the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality.
Now I prove the second part of the inequality. Note that
δF ω(S
′ω′)∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω(S ′ω′′)
=
βδF ω(Sω
′
)∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ βF
ω(Sω′′)
=
δF ω(Sω
′
)∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω(Sω′′)
for all ω, ω′ Thus, (δ, {S ′ω}Nω=1) satisfies equation (C.1).
Now, I construct a sequence of updating mechanism with asymptotic utility loss
converges to 0 as M → ∞. Consider a “star” updating mechanism illustrated in
figure 8. In the central memory state of the star, the DM randomly chooses one of
the N actions; while there are N equiv-length branches that correspond to each of
the N actions. For the ease of exposition, denote λ = ⌊(M − 1)/N⌋, I relabel the
memory states in the star as 0, 11, 12, · · · , 1λ, 21, 22, · · · , 2λ, · · · , Nλ and denote the
unused memory states as Nλ+1, Nλ+2, · · · ,M − 1. Formally, the decision rule is
as follows:33
d(0) =
1
N
× {1}+ 1
N
× {2}+ · · ·+ 1
N
× {N};
d(ik) = i for all i = 1, . . . , N and k = 1, · · · , λ;
d(m) = 1 for all m > Nλ.
The transition function between the memory states is defined as below for some
δ > 1 and {Si}Ni=1 that satisfies the two inequalities in lemma C.1. Denote Si(s) as
33The action chosen in the unused memory states can be assigned to any of the N actions.
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the probability assigned to the realization s in the lottery Si and pick {Si}Ni=1 such
that
∑N
i=1 S
i(s) ≤ 1 for all s ∈ S.34 Suppose the DM receives some signal s, he
follows the following transition rule:
T (0, s) =
N∑
i=1
Si(s)× {i1}+
(
1−
N∑
i=1
Si(s)
)
× {0}
T (i1, s) = Si(s)× {i2}+
∑
j∈Ω\{i}
Sj(s)
δ
× {0}
+

 ∑
j∈Ω\{i}
Sj(s)(1− 1
δ
) + 1−
N∑
j=1
Sj(s)

× {i1}
T (iλ, s) =
∑
j∈Ω\{i}
Sj(s)
δ
× {i(λ− 1)}
+

Si(s) + ∑
j∈Ω\{i}
Sj(s)(1− 1
δ
) + 1−
N∑
j=1
Sj(s)

× {iλ}
while for k = 2, 3, · · · , λ− 1,
T (ik, s) = Si(s)× {i(k + 1)}+
∑
j∈Ω\{i}
Sj(s)
δ
× {i(k − 1)}
+

 ∑
j∈Ω\{i}
Sj(s)(1− 1
δ
) + 1−
N∑
j=1
Sj(s)

× {ik}
Finally, for m > Nλ, T (m, s) = m for all s. Restricting the initial memory state to
one of 0, 11, 12, · · · , 1λ, 21, 22, · · · , 2λ, · · · , Nλ, the DM will never transit to memory
states m > Nλ.
Before I prove the proposition, it would be useful to discuss the interpretation of
the updating mechanism. It could be interpreted as a two-steps transition rule that
involving first labeling the signal as supporting one of the states in Ω or not support-
ing any states, and then transiting based on the label of the signal. In particular,
upon receiving a signal s, the DM labels it as supporting state ω with probabil-
ity Sω(s) for all ω ∈ Ω and labels it as supporting no state with the remaining
probability.
Next, the transition rule based on the labeling could be interpreted as the DM
tracks only the favorable action and his confidence level of that action ranging from
1 to λ, as mentioned in the main text. Say at some period t the favorable action of
34Such {Si}Ni=1 exists as shown in the second part of lemma C.1.
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the DM is ω, he revises his confidence level one unit upwards if he receives a signal
supporting state ω (belief-confirming signal); he revises his confidence level one unit
downwards with probability 1
δ
< 1 if he receives a signal supporting other states
(belief-challenging signal); in all other cases he does not revise his confidence level.
It therefore can be interpreted as a learning algorithm with a particular (stochastic)
definition of belief-confirming or belief-challenging signals, and under-reaction to
belief challenging signals.
Now I compute the stationary probability distribution µω. Fix the state ω, in
the stationary probability distribution, we have at the two extreme memory states
in branch ω′, i.e., memory states ω′λ and ω′(λ− 1),
µωω′(λ−1)F
ω(Sω
′
) = µωω′λ
1
δ
∑
ω′′ 6=ω′
F ω(Sω
′′
)
µωω′(λ−1) = µ
ω
ω′λ
[
δF ω(Sω
′
)∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω(Sω′′)
]−1
for all ω′. That is, in the stationary distribution, the probability mass that enters
memory state ω′λ equals that leaves it. It also implies at memory state ω′(λ− 1),
µωω′λ
1
δ
∑
ω′′ 6=ω′
F ω(Sω
′′
) + µωω′(λ−2)F
ω(Sω′) = µ
ω
ω′(λ−1)
[
1
δ
∑
ω′′ 6=ω′
F ω(Sω
′′
) + F ω(Sω
′
)
]
µωω′(λ−2)F
ω(Sω
′
) = µωω′(λ−1)
1
δ
∑
ω′′ 6=ω′
F ω(Sω
′′
)
µωω′(λ−2) = µ
ω
ω′(λ−1)
[
δF ω(Sω
′
)∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω(Sω′′)
]−1
Repeating the same procedures implies that for all k = 1, · · · , λ
µωω′k = µ
ω
ω′λ
[
δF ω(Sω
′
)∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω(Sω′′)
]−(λ−k)
(C.3)
and
µω0 = µ
ω
ω′λ
[
δF ω(Sω
′
)∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω(Sω′′)
]−λ
(C.4)
As
∑N
ω′=1
∑λ
k=1 µ
ω
ω′k + µ
ω
0 = 1, we have
µωωλ
λ∑
k=1
[
δF ω(Sω)∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω(Sω′′)
]−(λ−k)
+ µωωλ
[
δF ω(Sω)∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω(Sω′′)
]−λ
+ µωωλ
[
δF ω(Sω)∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω(Sω′′)
]−λ ∑
ω′ 6=ω
λ∑
k=1
[
δF ω(Sω
′
)∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω(Sω′′)
](λ−k)
= 1 (C.5)
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The two inequalities in lemma C.1 imply that fixing N , as λ→∞,
µωωλ
[
δF ω(Sω)∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω(Sω′′)
]−λ
+
µωωλ
[
δF ω(Sω)∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω(Sω′′)
]−λ ∑
ω′ 6=ω
λ∑
k=1
[
δF ω(Sω
′
)∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω(Sω′′)
](λ−k)
→ 0 (C.6)
Thus,
λ∑
k=1
µωωk = µ
µ
ωλ
λ∑
k=1
[
δF ω(Sω)∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω(Sω′′)
]−(λ−k)
→ 1 (C.7)
for all ω and the asymptotic utility loss of the proposed non-ignorant updating
mechanism is 0, which proves limλ→∞ L∗M = 0.
C.2 Proof of corollary 1
Proof. Note that an ignorant updating mechanism induces utility loss weakly greater
than minω u
ωpω which is invariant in M . On the other hand, as shown in propo-
sition 1, L∗M converges to 0 as M → ∞. It implies there exists some big enough
M¯ such that for M > M¯ , L∗M < minω u
ωpω. Consider ǫ < minω u
ωpω − L∗¯
M
, if an
updating mechanism T ignores some state ω′, for we have for M > M¯
L(T ) ≥ uω′pω′ ≥ min
ω
uωpω > L∗¯M + ǫ
which proves the result.
C.3 Proof of corollary 2
Proof. By proposition 1, we have for all ω
lim
M→∞
lim
ǫ→0
lim
t→∞
Pr(aIt = ω | ω) = 1 for I = A,B.
which proves the result.
C.4 Proof of proposition 2
Proof. When N and M is finite, consider two states ω, ω′, with similar argument in
Hellman and Cover (1970), we have
Υωω
′ ≤ (lωω
′
l
ω′ω
)M−1
min
m∈Mω′
µωm
µω′m
≥ (lωω′ lω′ω)−(M−1) max
m∈Mω
µωm
µω′m
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where l
ωω′
= sups
fω(s)
fω
′(s)
. Suppose the DM chooses action ω in state ω with proba-
bility 1− ε and chooses action ω in state ω′ with probability ε′, i.e.,
∑
m∈Mω
µωm = 1− ε and
∑
m∈Mω
µω
′
m = ε
′.
This implies that minmaxm∈Mω
µωm
µω
′
m
= 1−ε
ε′
and
min
m∈Mω′
µωm
µω′m
≥ (lωω
′
l
ω′ω
)−(M−1)
1− ε
ε′
.
Moreover, as
∑
m∈Mω′ µ
ω
m +
∑
m∈Mω µ
ω
m ≤ 1, we have
∑
m∈Mω′ µ
ω
m ≤ ε and
ǫ
maxm∈Mω′ µω
′
m
≥ min
m∈Mω′
µωm
µω′m
≥ (lωω
′
l
ω′ω
)−(M−1)
1− ε
ε′
max
m∈Mω′
µω
′
m ≤ (l
ωω′
l
ω′ω
)M−1
εε′
1− ε
As (l
ωω′
l
ω′ω
)M−1 is bounded above, for ε and ε′ small enough, we must have
∑
m∈Mω′
µω
′
m < M max
m∈Mω′
µω
′
m < M(l
ωω′
l
ω′ω
)M−1
εε′
1− ε < 1.
Thus, if the DM chooses ε and ε′ close to 0, we must have
∑
m∈Mω′ µ
ω′
m close to 0
and the utility loss is bigger than uω
′
pω
′
. Therefore, L∗M > 0.
To prove the second part of the proposition, note that the DM can always “throw
away” memory states. Formally, consider an updating mechanism (T , d) with M ,
and suppose the DM’s memory capacity increases to M ′ > M . He can design an
updating mechanism (T ′, d′) with T ′(m, s) = T (m, s) and d′(m) = d(m) for all
m ≤M . By choosing an initial memory state in m ≤M , the DM will never transit
to memory states m > M . The stationary distribution and thus utility loss does not
change. Therefore, the DM can always secure a weakly lower L∗M when M increases,
i.e., L∗M weakly decreases in M .
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C.5 Proof of proposition 3
Proof. I first prove the first statement. Following Hellman and Cover (1970), we
have for all ω′
min
m∈M
µω
′
m
µωm
≥ (lωω′ lω′ω)−(M−1) max
m∈M
µω
′
m
µωm
min
m∈M
µω
′
m
µωm
≥ ς2(M−1) max
m∈M
µω
′
m
µωm
min
m∈M
µω
′
m
µωm
≥ ς2(M−1) minmax
m∈M
µω
′
m
µωm
min
m∈M
µω
′
m
µωm
≥ ς2(M−1)
uω
′
pω
′
µω
′
m
uωpωµωm
≥ ς2(M−1)u
ω′pω
′
uωpω
for all m.
(C.8)
Given pω, minmaxω′
uω
′
pω
′
uωpω
= u
u
1−pω
N−1
pω
. Thus, when pω is small enough, there exists
some ω′ 6= ω
uω
′
pω
′
µω
′
m
uωpωµωm
≥ ς2(M−1)minmax
ω′
uω
′
pω
′
uωpω
≥ ς2(M−1)u
u
1−pω
N−1
pω
> 1 + A for all m ∈M .
for some A > 0. SupposeMω 6= ∅, it implies that if the DM chooses action ω′ instead
of action ω memory state m, his asymptotic utility loss decreases by uω
′
pω
′
µω
′
m −
uωpωµωm ≥ 0. Thus when ǫ → 0, we have either Mω = ∅ or maxω′ uω′pω′µω′m −
uωpωµωm → 0. As maxω′ uω′pω′µω′m−uωpωµωm > Auωpωµωm, maxω′ uω′pω′µω′m−uωpωµωm →
0 also implies uωpωµωm → 0 and maxω′ uω′pω′µω′m → 0. Therefore, uω′pω′µω′m → 0 for
all ω′. As Mω is finite and uω
′
pω
′
> 0 for ω′,
∑
m∈Mω µ
ω′
m → 0 for all ω′.
I now prove the second statement. Note that L∗M is given by the following
minimization problem. Denote βω = 1−∑m∈Mω µωm,
L∗M = min
N∑
ω=1
uωpωβω
subject to (βω)Nω=1 ∈ cl(M )
where M is the feasibility set and cl(M ) is the closure of M . As an example, when
N = M = 2, M is characterized by equation 7. We could also represent the problem
as a maximization problem:
max
N∑
ω=1
uωpωαω
subject to (αω)Nω=1 ∈ cl(M˜ )
where (αω)Nω=1 ∈ cl(M˜ ) if and only if (1− αω)Nω=1 ∈ cl(M ).
42
Suppose for some (uω
′
, pω
′
)Nω′=1, ǫ-optimal updating mechanisms must ignore
state ω as ǫ → 0. Denote (αω′∗)Nω′=1 as the solution of the maximization problem.
It implies that αω∗ = 0 and
∑
ω′ 6=ω
uω
′
pω
′
αω
′∗ >
N∑
ω′=1
uω
′
pω
′
αω
′
for all (αω
′
)Nω′=1 ∈ cl(M ) where αω > 0. Rearranging the inequality gives us
∑
ω′ 6=ω
uω
′
pω
′
uωpω
(αω
′∗ − αω′) > αω.
Now, without loss of generality assume ω 6= 1,
∑
ω′ 6=ω
u˜ω
′
p˜ω
′
u˜ωp˜ω
(αω
′∗ − αω′) =
∑
ω′ 6=ω
u˜ω
′
p˜ω
′
u˜1p˜1
× u˜
1p˜1
u˜ωp˜ω
(αω
′∗ − αω′)
=
∑
ω′ 6=ω
uω
′
pω
′
u1p1
× u˜
1p˜1
u˜ωp˜ω
(αω
′∗ − αω′)
=
u˜1p˜1
u˜ωp˜ω
× u
ωpω
u1p1
×
∑
ω′ 6=ω
uω
′
pω
′
u1p1
× u
1p1
uωpω
(αω
′∗ − αω′)
>
∑
ω′ 6=ω
uω
′
pω
′
u1p1
× u
1p1
uωpω
(αω
′∗ − αω′)
> αω.
It implies that ∑
ω′ 6=ω
u˜ω
′
p˜ω
′
αω
′∗ >
N∑
ω′=1
u˜ω
′
p˜ω
′
αω
′
for all (αω
′
)Nω′=1 ∈ cl(M ) where αω > 0. Thus ǫ′-optimal updating mechanisms must
ignore state ω as ǫ′ → 0.
C.6 Proof of corollary 3
Proof. By proposition 3, if pωA is small enough for all ω ∈ NA ⊂ N and pωB is small
enough for all ω ∈ NB = N \NA, individual A never picks action ω for all ω ∈ NA
and individual B never picks action ω for all ω ∈ N \ NA. Therefore, they must
disagree with each other.
C.7 Proof of proposition 4
Proof. First, as M = 1 for individual A, his action is constant in all periods for all
signal realizations. The optimal automaton is thus M2 = M3 = ∅ and aAt = 1 for
all t. Now I characterize the(almost) optimal updating mechanism of individual B.
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With some abuse of notations, denote L∗2(nn
′) as optimal utility loss where the DM
chooses action n in memory state 1 and action n′ in memory state 2. Building on
results in Hellman and Cover (1970), we have
L∗2(11) =
2
3
− 2ν,
L∗2(22) = L
∗
2(33) =
2
3
+ ν,
L∗2(12) = L
∗
2(13) =
1
3
− ν +
2
√
(1 + τ)
(
1
3
+ 2ν
) (
1
3
− ν)− (2
3
− ν)
τ
,
L∗2(23) =
1
3
+ 2ν +
2
(
1
3
− ν)√1 + Υ− (2
3
− 2ν)
Υ
.
where L∗2(22) = L
∗
2(33) > L
∗
2(11) ≥ L∗2(12) = L∗2(13). I first prove L∗2(12) > L∗2(23)
if and only if ν is small enough. First, L∗2(12) > L
∗
2(23) if and only if
△L2(12−23) = 3ν+
2(1
3
− ν)√1 + Υ
Υ
−
2
3
− 2ν
Υ
−
2
√
(1 + τ)(1
3
+ 2ν)(1
3
− ν)
τ
+
2
3
+ ν
τ
< 0.
When ν = 0,
△L2(12− 23) = 2
3
(√
1 + Υ
Υ
−
√
1 + τ
τ
)
− 2
3
(
1
Υ
− 1
τ
)
.
As both
√
1+x
x
and 1
x
decreases in x, and Υ > τ , △L2(12− 23) < 0 when ν = 0, i.e.,
L∗2(12) > L
∗
2(23) when ν = 0, which by continuity proves the result.
C.8 Proof of proposition 5
Proof. I show that for all ǫ > 0, there exists a sequence of updating mechanism with
utility loss converges to smaller than ǫ as N,M → ∞. First, by assumption 2, for
all ǫ
u¯
> 0, there exists an ξ > 0 and a sequence of subset of states Nξ such that
limN→∞
(∑
ω∈Nξ p
ω
N
)
> 1− ǫ
u¯
and
lim
N→∞
inf
ω,ω′∈Nξ;ω′ 6=ω

− log
∫
fωN (s)f
ω′
N (s)ds√∫
(fωN (s))
2ds
√∫
(fω
′
N (s))
2ds

 > ξ
Before proving the proposition, I first prove the following lemma for (SωN)
N
ω=1 defined
in equation (C.2).
Lemma C.2. For ǫ
u¯
> 0, there exists an ξ˜ > 0, a sequence of δN > 1 and a sequence
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of subset of states Nξ with limN→∞
(∑
ω∈Nξ p
ω
N
)
> 1− ǫ
u¯
such that
δNF
ω
N(S
ω′
N )∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω
N(S
ω′′
N )
> 2 for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω and N ;
lim
N→∞
inf
ω,ω′∈Nξ;ω′ 6=ω
δNF
ω
N (S
ω
N)∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω
N (S
ω′′
N )
δNF
ω
N(S
ω′
N )∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω
N(S
ω′′
N )
> 1 + ξ˜.
(C.9)
Proof. As F ωN(S
ω′
N ) > 0 for all ω, ω
′, there always exists a δN such that the first
inequality of equation (C.9) holds. To prove the second inequality, note that
lim
N→∞
inf
ω,ω′∈Nξ;ω′ 6=ω
δNF
ω
N (S
ω
N)∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω
N (S
ω′′
N )
δNF
ω
N(S
ω′
N )∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω
N(S
ω′′
N )
≥ lim
N→∞
inf
ω,ω′∈Nξ;ω′ 6=ω
F ωN(S
ω
N )
F ωN (S
ω′
N )
= lim
N→∞
inf
ω,ω′∈Nξ;ω′ 6=ω
√∫
(fωN (s))
2ds
√∫
(fω
′
N (s))
2ds∫
fωN(s)f
ω′
N (s)ds
> exp (ξ)
=1 + ξ˜
(C.10)
where first inequality of equation (C.10) is implied by the fact that F ωN(S
ω
N ) ≥
F ωN(S
ω′
N ) and thus
∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω
N (S
ω′′
N )∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω
N (S
ω′′
N )
≥ 1.
Now consider a sequence of “star” updating mechanism described in the proof of
proposition 1, but include only states in Nξ, i.e., there are only branches correspond
to actions in Nξ and exists no m ∈ M such that d(m) = ω′ for ω′ /∈ Nξ. As in the
proof of proposition 1, I compute the stationary distribution under state ω ∈ Nξ:
lim
N,M→∞
{
µωNωλ
λ∑
k=1
[
δNF
ω
N(S
ω
N)∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω
N(S
ω′′
N )
]−(λ−k)
+ µωNωλ
[
δNF
ω
N(S
ω
N)∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω
N (S
ω′′
N )
]−λ
+ µωNωλ
[
δNF
ω
N(S
ω
N)∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω
N(S
ω′′
N )
]−λ ∑
ω′∈Nξ\{ω}
λ∑
k=1
[
δNF
ω
N (S
ω′
N )∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω
N(S
ω′′
N )
](λ−k)}
= 1 (C.11)
where µωNm is the stationary probability in memory state m under state ω when
state space has size N . As limN,M→∞ MN = ∞, limN,M→∞ λ = ∞. Given the first
inequality of lemma C.2, µωNωλ
[
δNF
ω
N (S
ω
N )∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω
N (S
ω′′
N )
]−λ
→ 0 as λ → ∞. On the other
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hand,
lim
N,λ→∞
[
δNF
ω
N (S
ω
N)∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω
N (S
ω′′
N )
]−λ ∑
ω′∈Nξ\{ω}
λ∑
k=1
[
δNF
ω
N(S
ω′
N )∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω
N (S
ω′′
N )
](λ−k)
= lim
N,λ→∞
[
δNF
ω
N (S
ω
N)∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω
N (S
ω′′
N )
]−λ ∑
ω′∈Nξ\{ω}
[
δNF
ω
N (S
ω′
N )∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω
N (S
ω′′
N )
]λ
− 1
δFωN (S
ω′
N )∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω
N (S
ω′′
N )
− 1
≤ lim
N,λ→∞
∑
ω′∈Nξ\{ω}




δNF
ω
N (S
ω′
N )∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω
N (S
ω′′
N )
δNF
ω
N (S
ω
N )∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω
N (S
ω′′
N )


λ
−
[
δNF
ω
N (S
ω
N)∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω
N (S
ω′′
N )
]−λ
≤ lim
N,λ→∞
∑
ω′∈Nξ\{ω}
(1 + ξ˜)−λ
≤ lim
N,λ→∞
N(1 + ξ˜)−λ
where the first inequality is implied by the first inequality in lemma C.2. As (1+ξ˜)−λ
converges to 0 exponentially and N converges to infinite linearly, limN,λ→∞N(1 +
ξ˜)−λ = 0. To see it formally, note that N = O(Mh) with h < 1 and λ = M
N
implies
that N = O(λ
h
1−h ) where h
1−h ∈ (0,∞). We have
lim
λ→∞
λ
h
1−h
(1 + ξ˜)λ
= lim
λ→∞
h
1−hλ
h
1−h
−1
(log(1 + ξ˜))(1 + ξ˜)λ
= lim
λ→∞
h
1−h(
h
1−h − 1)λ
h
1−h
−2
(log(1 + ξ˜))2(1 + ξ˜)λ
· · ·
= 0
Thus,
0 ≤ lim
N,λ→∞
[
δNF
ω
N (S
ω
N)∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω
N (S
ω′′
N )
]−λ ∑
ω′∈Nξ\{ω}
λ∑
k=1
[
δNF
ω
N(S
ω′
N )∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω
N(S
ω′′
N )
](λ−k)
≤ lim
N,λ→∞
N(1 + ξ˜)−λ = 0
and limN,λ→∞
[
δNF
ω
N (S
ω
N )∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω
N (S
ω′′
N )
]−λ∑
ω′∈Nξ\{ω}
∑λ
k=1
[
δNF
ω
N (S
ω′
N )∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω
N (S
ω′′
N )
](λ−k)
= 0, which
implies
lim
N,λ→∞
λ∑
k=1
µωNωk = lim
N,λ→∞
µµNωλ
λ∑
k=1
[
δNF
ω
N (S
ω
N)∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω
N (S
ω′′
N )
]−(λ−k)
= 1 (C.12)
for all ω ∈ Nξ. As limN→∞
∑
ω∈Nξ p
ω
N > 1 − ǫu¯ , the asymptotic utility loss of the
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proposed non-ignorant updating mechanism is bounded above by u¯× ǫ
u¯
= ǫ.
C.9 Proof of corollary 4
Proof. Suppose in contrary the sequence of updating mechanism TN ignores strictly
more than ǫ
u
measures of states at the limit. Denoted the set of states that is ignored
by N˜ , the utility loss is
lim
N,M→∞
LN (TN ) ≥ lim
N→∞
∑
ω∈N˜
uωNp
ω
N ≥ u lim
N→∞
∑
ω∈N˜
pωN > u
ǫ
u
= ǫ = lim
N,M→∞
L∗NM + ǫ
which proves the result.
C.10 Proof of corollary 5
Proof. By proposition 5, we have for individual I:
lim
N,M→∞
lim
ǫ→0
lim
t→∞
N∑
ω=1
[
1
{
lim
t→∞
PrN(a
I
t = ω | ω) = 1
}
pωI
]
= 1
which is equivalent to
lim
N,M→∞
lim
ǫ→0
lim
t→∞
N∑
ω=1
[
1
{
lim
t→∞
PrN(a
I
t = ω | ω) < 1
}
pωI
]
= 0,
i.e., individual I would only take sub-optimal actions in probability 0 events mea-
sured by (pωNI)
N
ω=1. As limN→∞ p
ω
NA > 0 if and only if limN→∞ p
ω
NB > 0 for all ω, com-
bined with assumption 1 implies that individual A and B agree on the probability 0
events. That is, for any sequence of subset of states Nˆ where limN→∞
∑
ω∈Nˆ p
ω
NA = 0,
we have limN→∞
∑
ω∈Nˆ p
ω
NB = 0, which implies the result.
C.11 Proof of proposition 6
Proof. First, note that for limN,M→∞ L∗NM = 0, we must have
lim
N,M→∞
∑
m∈Mω
µωNm = 1
for almost all ω, i.e., there must exists a sequence of subset of states Nˆ where
limN→∞
∑
ω∈Nˆ p
ω
N = 1 and
lim
N,M→∞
∑
m∈Mω
µωNm = 1.
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for all ω ∈ Nˆ . Moreover, assumption 1 implies that there must exists a sequence of
subset of states Nˆ where limN→
|Nˆ |
N
= 1 and
lim
N,M→∞
∑
m∈Mω
µωNm = 1,
for all ω ∈ Nˆ . That is, the DM chooses the optimal action in almost all states,
measured in both prior probability or in fraction. It implies that for all ω in Nˆ ,
there must exist a set of memory state Mˆω ⊆Mω such that
lim
N,M→∞
∑
m∈Mˆω
µωNm = 1
lim
N,M→∞
∑
m∈Mˆω
µω
′
Nm = 0 for all ω
′ ∈ Nˆ \ {ω}
lim
N,M→∞
max
m∈Mˆω
µωNm
µω
′
Nm
=∞ for all ω′ ∈ Nˆ \ {ω}
(C.13)
In the following I prove that for equation (C.13) to hold, M
N
has to go to ∞. First
consider an irreducible automaton. Fix a ω′ ∈ Nˆ \ {ω}, without loss of generality
rearrange the memory states such that
µωNm
µω
′
Nm
is weakly decreasing in m. By lemma 2
of Hellman and Cover (1970), we have for all m < M ,
µωN(m+1)
µω
′
N(m+1)
≥ (lωω′N l
ω′ω
N )
−1µ
ω
Nm
µω
′
Nm
≥ ς2µ
ω
Nm
µω
′
Nm
.
(C.14)
As there must exists some m with
µωNm
µω
′
Nm
≤ 1, if max µωNm
µω
′
Nm
=
µωN1
µω
′
N1
> K, equation (C.14)
implies that
µωNm′
µω
′
Nm′
≥ ς2(m′−1)µ
ω
N1
µω
′
N1
> ς2(m
′−1)K
and ς2(m
′−1)K ≥ 1 for all m′ − 1 ≤ logK
2 log(ς)−1
. In other words, there must exists
at least logK
2 log(ς)−1
+ 1 memory states with a state ω − ω′ likelihood ratio µωNm
µω
′
Nm
≥ 1.
Repeating the same analysis for other ω′′ ∈ Nˆ \{ω} implies that if max µωNm
µω
′′
Nm
> K for
all ω′′ ∈ Nˆ \ {ω′}, there must exists at logK
2 log(ς)−1
+ 1 memory states with a likelihood
ratio minω′∈Nˆ
µωNm
µω
′
Nm
≥ 1.
With similar arguments, if max
µωNm
µω
′
Nm
> K for all ω ∈ Nˆ and all ω′ ∈ Nˆ \ {ω}, M|Nˆ |
must be weakly greater than logK
2 log(ς)−1
+ 1. It implies that M|Nˆ | goes to ∞ as K goes
to ∞. It contradicts the fact that limN,M→∞ M|Nˆ | = limN,M→∞ MN <∞ in big worlds.
Now I analysis the case of reducible automatons. Denote the recurrent commu-
nicating classes as R1, · · · ,Rr, and the set of transient memory states as R0. The
analysis above applies in the cases where there is only one recurrent communicating
class or where the initial memory state is in one of the recurrent communicating
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classes.
Now consider the case where r > 1, i.e., there are more than one recurrent
communicating class, and the initial memory state denoted by i is in R0. I first
compute the probability of absorption by Rj under state ω, denoted by P
ω
N(Rj).
Consider a new transition rule T ′ where all transitions from m ∈ R0 to another
m′ ∈ R0 is the same as before. However, T ′ differs from T that all transitions from
m ∈ R0 to m′ /∈ R0 are changed to transition from m to i. Given such a transition
rule T ′, obviously only memory states in R0 are reachable. Denote µ0ωNm as the
stationary distribution of this new transition rule T ′.
As is known in the theory of Markov chain (see appendix 2 of Hellman (1969)),
Pω(Rj) is given by:
P
ω
N(Rj) =
∑
m∈R0
µ0ωNm
∑
m′∈Rj
qωmm′
Also denote µjωNm as the stationary distribution of the recurrent communicating class
Rj, we have for m ∈ Rj
µωNm
µω
′
Nm
=
PωN(Rj)
Pω
′
N (Rj)
× µ
jω
Nm
µjω
′
Nm
=
∑
m∈R0 µ
0ω
Nm
∑
m′∈Rj q
ω
mm′∑
m∈R0 µ
0ω′
Nm
∑
m′∈Rj q
ω′
mm′
× µ
jω
Nm
µjω
′
Nm
≤ς−2 max
m∈R0
µ0ωNm
µ0ωNm
× µ
jω
Nm
µjω
′
Nm
.
Thus, if max
µωNm
µω
′
Nm
> K, we must have
ς−2 max
m∈R0
µ0ωNm
µ0ωNm
× max
j∈{1,2,··· ,r}
max
m∈Rj
µjωNm
µjω
′
Nm
> K
Thus, when K →∞, we must have either
max
m∈R0
µ0ωNm
µ0ωNm
→∞, or;
max
j∈{1,2,··· ,r}
max
m∈Rj
µjωNm
µjω
′
Nm
→∞.
Then the result follows similar arguments in the case of irreducible automatons.
C.12 Proof of proposition 7
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there exists a sequence of subset of states N˜
where limN→∞
|N˜ |
N
> 0 such that for all ω ∈ N˜ , the DM takes action ω with some
strictly positive probability in some state ω′ (where ω′ could be different for different
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ω). Formally, it implies that for all ω ∈ N˜
lim
N.M→∞
∑
m∈Mω
µω
′
Nm ≥ ξ > 0
for some ω′. As Mω must be finite for almost all ω measured in fraction, it implies
that there exists some N˜ ′ where limN→∞
|N˜ ′|
N
> 0 for all ω ∈ N˜ there exists some
ω′ ∈ Ω,
lim
N.M→∞
µω
′
Nm ≥ ξ′ > 0 for some m ∈Mω .
Now denote the set of ω′, the set of states of the world where the DM picks some
action ω ∈ N˜ ′ with strictly positive probability as N˜ ′′. We must have limN,M→∞ |N˜ ′′|N >
0. Otherwise, there must exist some ω′ ∈ N˜ ′′ such that there are infinitely many
memory states with strictly positive probability and it contradicts the fact that
limN,M→∞
∑M
m=1 µ
ω′
Nm = 1. With similar arguments, for almost all ω ∈ N˜ ′, there
must exists some m ∈ Mω such that limN,M→∞ µω′Nm ≥ ξ′ for some ω′ ∈ N˜ ′′ but
limN,M→∞ µω
′′
Nm = 0 for almost all states ω
′′ ∈ N˜ \ {ω′}. It implies that there exists
some sequence of subset of states ˜˜N where limN→∞
| ˜˜N |
N
> 0 such that
lim
N,M→∞
max
m
µω
′
Nm
µω
′′
Nm
=∞
for all ω′ ∈ ˜˜N and all ω′′ ∈ ˜˜N \ {ω′}. But that is proved to be impossible in the
proof of proposition 6. The result thus follows.
C.13 Proof of corollary 6
Proof. Consider an example where limN→∞ pωN = 0 for all ω. As shown in the
proposition 7, all sequence of updating mechanisms must ignore almost all actions
when N,M goes to infinite. Thus, limN,M→∞L∗NM = limN→∞
∑
ω u
ω
Np
ω
N and all
updating mechanism is ǫ-optimal for any ǫ ≥ 0. Thus, if individual A adopts an
updating mechanism with d(m) = 1 for all m and all N and individual B adopts
an updating mechanism with d(m) = 2 for all m and all N ≥ 2, then they must
disagree with each other under all ω.
D Robustness of the results in small world to up-
dating mistakes
In below I show that the behavior implications is small world, i.e., learning is close
to Bayesian, and that disagreement does not persist, hold even when individuals
make “updating mistakes”. In other words, the results are robust to individuals’
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limited ability to design and follow an “optimal” updating mechanism.
Consider two individuals A and B. Individual A adopts the star updating mech-
anism described in the proof of proposition 1 while individual B “attempts” to adopt
the same updating mechanism but makes local mistakes as he randomly transits to
neighbor memory states with some probability γ ∈ (0, 1). Formally, the transition
rule of individual B, denoted as T ′(m, s), is as follows:
T
′(0, s) = (1− γ)× T (0, s) +
N∑
j=1
γ
N
× {j1}
T
′(i1, s) = (1− γ)× T (i1, s) + γ
2
× {i2}+ γ
2
× {0}
T
′(iλ, s) = (1− γ)× T (iλ, s) + γ × {i(λ− 1)}
while for k = 2, 3, · · · , λ− 1,
T
′(ik, s) = (1− γ)×T (ik, s) + γ
2
× {i(k − 1)}+ γ
2
× {i(k + 1)}
where T (m, s) is defined in the proof of proposition 1. Such updating mistakes
could be induced by memory imperfection, i.e., the DM’s memory state is subject
to local fluctuations, or imperfect perception on signals, e.g., the DMmay mistakenly
perceive any signal as a signal that support state ω.
Proposition D.1. Consider individual A who adopts the star updating mechanism
and individual B who makes local mistakes with some probability γ ∈ (0, 1), charac-
terized above by T ′(m, s). Fix a finite N , for all γ ∈ (0, 1), utility loss of individ-
ual B converges to 0 as M →∞, i.e.,
lim
M→∞
L(T ′) = 0.
Individual A and B are bound to agree in small worlds, i.e., for all (uωA, p
ω
A, f
ω
A)
N
ω=1,
(uωB, p
ω
B, f
ω
B)
N
ω=1, fixing N and M →∞,
lim
M→∞
lim
ǫ→0
lim
t→∞
Pr(aAt = a
B
t | ω) = 1 for all ω.
Proof. The proof follows closely the proof of proposition 1. For individual B, fixing
the state ω, in the stationary probability distribution, we have at the two extreme
memory states in branch ω′,
µωω′λ
[
1− γ
δ
∑
ω′′ 6=ω′
F ω(Sω
′′
) + γ
]
= µωω′(λ−1)
[
(1− γ)F ω(Sω′) + γ
2
]
µωω′(λ−1) = µ
ω
ω′λ
[
(1− γ)F ω(Sω′) + γ
2
1−γ
δ
∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω(Sω′′) + γ
]−1
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for all ω′. Similarly, at memory state ω′(λ− 1),
µωω′λ
[
1− γ
δ
∑
ω′′ 6=ω′
F ω(Sω
′′
) + γ
]
+ µωω′(λ−2)
[
(1− γ)F ω(Sω′) + γ
2
]
= µωω′(λ−1)
[
1− γ
δ
∑
ω′′ 6=ω′
F ω(Sω
′′
) + (1− γ)F ω(Sω′) + γ
]
µωω′(λ−2)
[
(1− γ)F ω(Sω′) + γ
2
]
= µωω′(λ−1)
[
1− γ
δ
∑
ω′′ 6=ω′
F ω(Sω
′′
) +
γ
2
]
µωω′(λ−2) = µ
ω
ω′(λ−1)
[
(1− γ)F ω(Sω′) + γ
2
1−γ
δ
∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω(Sω′′) + γ
2
]−1
Repeating the same procedures implies that for all k = 1, · · · , λ− 1
µωω′k = µ
ω
ω′λ
[
(1− γ)F ω(Sω′) + γ
2
1−γ
δ
∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω(Sω′′) + γ
]−1 [
(1− γ)F ω(Sω′) + γ
2
1−γ
δ
∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω(Sω′′) + γ
2
]−(λ−k−1)
(D.1)
and
µω0 = µ
ω
ω′λ
[
(1−γ)Fω(Sω′)+ γ
2
1−γ
δ
∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω(Sω′′ )+γ
]−1 [
(1−γ)Fω(Sω′)+ γ
2
1−γ
δ
∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω(Sω′′ )+ γ
2
]−(λ−2) [
(1−γ)Fω(Sω′ )+ γ
N
1−γ
δ
∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω(Sω′′)+ γ
2
]
(D.2)
Note that for all γ ∈ (0, 1)
(1− γ)F ω(Sω) + γ
2
1−γ
δ
∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω(Sω′′) + γ
2
> 1.
(1− γ)F ω(Sω) + γ
2
1−γ
δ
∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω(Sω′′) + γ
2
>
(1− γ)F ω(Sω′) + γ
2
1−γ
δ
∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω(Sω′′) + γ
2
which is the analogue of lemma C.1. Then following the same steps in the proof of
proposition 1 proves the result.
Next I prove the analogue result in the extension where N,M → ∞ and N =
O(Mh) with h < 1. Assume that individual A adopts a star updating mechanism
with a sequence of δN that satisfies
(1− γ)F ωN(Sω′N ) + γ2
1−γ
δN
∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω
N(S
ω′′
N ) +
γ
2
> 2 for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω and N .
Fixing γ ∈ (0, 1), such sequence of δN always exists as F ωN(Sω′N ) > 0 for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω
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and N . It also implies that δN goes to ∞ and
lim
N→∞
inf
ω,ω′∈Nξ;ω′ 6=ω
(1−γ)FωN (SωN )+ γ2
1−γ
δN
∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω
N
(Sω
′′
N
)+ γ
2
(1−γ)FωN (Sω
′
N )+
γ
2
1−γ
δN
∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω
N (S
ω′′
N )+
γ
2
= lim
N→∞
inf
ω,ω′∈Nξ;ω′ 6=ω
(1−γ)FωN (SωN )+ γ2
(1−γ)∑ω′′ 6=ω FωN (Sω
′′
N )+
γδN
2
(1−γ)FωN (Sω
′
N )+
γ
2
(1−γ)∑ω′′ 6=ω′ FωN (Sω
′′
N )+
γδN
2
≥ lim
N→∞
inf
ω,ω′∈Nξ;ω′ 6=ω
F ωN (S
ω
N) +
γ
2(1−γ)
F ωN(S
ω′
N ) +
γ
2(1−γ)
where the last inequality is implied by the fact that
∑
ω′′ 6=ω F
ω
N(S
ω′′
N ) ≤
∑
ω′′ 6=ω′ F
ω
N(S
ω′′
N ).
In lemma C.2, we know that for all ǫ
u
> 0 there exists ξ˜ > 0 and a sequence of subset
of state Nξ with limN→∞
(∑
N∈Nξ p
ω
N
)
> 1− ǫ
u
such that
lim
N→∞
inf
ω,ω′∈Nξ;ω′ 6=ω
F ωN (S
ω
N)
F ωN(S
ω′
N )
> 1 + ξ˜.
Thus, fixing γ < 1, there also exists some ˜˜ξ > 0 such that
lim
N→∞
inf
ω,ω′∈Nξ;ω′ 6=ω
F ωN(S
ω
N ) +
γ
2(1−γ)
F ωN (S
ω′
N ) +
γ
2(1−γ)
> 1 +
˜˜
ξ.
Then following the same steps in the proof of proposition 5 gives the following result.
Proposition D.2. Consider individual A who adopts the star updating mechanism
and individual B who makes local mistakes with some probability γ ∈ (0, 1), charac-
terize by T ′(m, s). Suppose N,M →∞ and N = O(Mh) where h < 1,
lim
N,M→∞
LN (T
′) = 0.
Moreover, the two individuals are almost bound to agree asymptotically in small
worlds if they agree on the probability 0 events. For all {(uωNA, pωNA, fωNA)Nω=1}∞N=1 and
{(uωNB, pωNB, fωNB)Nω=1}∞N=1 such that limN→∞ pωNA > 0 if and only if limN→∞ pωNB > 0
for all ω,
lim
N,M→∞
lim
ǫ→0
∑
ω
[
1
{
lim
t→∞
PrN(a
A
t = a
B
t | ω) = 1
}
pωNI
]
= 1 for I = A,B.
The result illustrates the robustness of agreement in small world. In particu-
lar, even if the individual makes local mistakes with probability close to 1, he will
(almost) learn perfectly the true state of the world asymptotically. Combining corol-
lary 2, 5 and proposition D.1 and D.2, we therefore expect disagreement to vanish
over time in small world among different individuals with different prior beliefs,
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abilities of information acquisition or abilities to avoid updating mistakes.
E An example of ignorance with uniform prior
belief and symmetric signal structures
In this section, I present an example which shows that not only prior belief and
signal distribution, but the complexity of the world plays a role in the optimality of
ignorant learning behaviors.
I consider a case where N = M ≥ 4 and states of the world are a priori uniformly
distributed, i.e., pω = 1
N
for all ω = {1, · · · , N}. Moreover, uω = 1 for all ω. For
simplicity, consider “symmetric” discrete signal structures where S = {s1, · · · .sN}
and sω is a signal that supports state ω. More specifically,
F ω(sω) = I F ω(sω
′
) for all ω and ω′ 6= ω where I > 1.
Thus, under all states of the world, it is I times more likely to receive a signal
supporting the true state than a signal supporting one of the other states.
In such a symmetric environment, there seems to be no reasons to ignore any
of the states. But now I will present an example showing that it is beneficial to
ignores some states when N is big. First consider a simple “symmetric” updating
mechanism that ignores no states, illustrated in figure 9 with an example of N = 4.
As the DM ignores no state, he allocates one memory state to each action. Without
loss of generality, assume he takes action ω in memory state ω. Upon receiving a
signal sω, i.e., a signal that supports state ω, he transits to memory state ω with
some probability δ < 1, and stays in his current memory state otherwise.
Formally, the transition function is as follows:
T (m, sω) = δ × {ω}+ (1− δ)× {m} for all m and ω.
Suppose state 1 is true, in the stationary distribution, we have
δµ1ω
∑
ω′ 6=ω
F 1(sω
′
) = δF 1(sω)
∑
ω′ 6=ω
µ1ω′ for all ω. (E.1)
It is easy to see that the solution of the system of equations satisfy:
µ11F
1(sω) = µ1ωF
1(s1) for all ω 6= 1,
which says that all probability mass going out from memory state 1 to memory
state ω must be equal to that going from memory state ω to memory state 1. Thus
µ11 = I µ
1
ω for all ω 6= 1, and µ11 = IN+I−1 . Repeating the same procedure for other
states of the world, the asymptotic utility of this symmetric non-ignorant updating
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1 2
3 4
δ × s3 δ × s1
δ × s2
δ × s1
δ × s4 δ × s2
δ × s4
δ × s3
δ × s3
δ × s2δ × s4
δ × s1
Figure 9: An example of an updating mechanism that considers all states, with
N = M = 4. The number in the node denotes the action that the DM takes when
he is that memory state. Moreover, upon receiving a signal that supporting state ω,
the DM transits to node ω with probability δ < 1 and stays in his current memory
state otherwise.
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1 2 3 4
δ × s2
s1
δ × s2
δ × s1
s2
δ × s1
Figure 10: An example of an updating mechanism that consider all states, with
N = M = 4. The DM takes action 1 in memory state 1 and 2, and takes action 2 in
memory state 3 and 4. Moreover, upon receiving a signal that supporting state ω,
the DM transits to node ω with probability δ < 1 and stays in his current memory
state otherwise.
mechanism equals:
N∑
ω=1
I
N + I − 1
1
N
=
I
N + I − 1 (E.2)
which decreases in N . When N is big, it is very easy for the DM to receive one
signal that support the wrong state and makes a mistake. Put differently, when N
is big, the updating mechanism is “noisier”.
Now consider an ignorant mechanism that follows similar idea of the non-ignorant
updating mechanism illustrated in figure 9, but ignores half of the states of the
worlds. For simplicity, assume that N is plural. The ignorant mechanism is illus-
trated in figure 10, with an example of N = 4. Ignoring half of the states, the DM
allocates two memory states to each action that he does not ignore. Without loss of
generality, assume that the DM takes action ω in memory state 2ω − 1 and 2ω for
ω ≤ N
2
, and ignores all actions ω′ > N
2
. In the “more confident” memory state 2ω,
upon receiving a signal supporting state ω′ 6= ω where ω′ ≤ N
2
, the DM transits to
state 2ω−1 with probability δ < 1 and stays in his current memory state otherwise.
In the “less confident” memory state 2ω − 1, upon receiving a signal supporting
state ω, he transits to the “more confident” memory state 2ω; upon receiving a
signal supporting state ω′ 6= ω where ω′ ≤ N
2
, the DM transits to state 2ω′− 1 with
probability δ < 1 and stays in his current memory state otherwise.
Formally, the transition function is as follows:
T (2ω, sω) = {2ω} for all ω ≤ N
2
,
T (2ω, sω
′
) = δ × {2ω − 1}+ (1− δ)× {2ω} for all ω ≤ N
2
, ω′ 6= ω and ω′ ≤ N
2
,
T (2ω − 1, sω) = {2ω} for all ω = 1, · · · , N
2
,
T (2ω − 1, sω′) = δ × {2ω′ − 1}+ (1− δ) × {2ω − 1} for all ω ≤ N
2
, ω′ 6= ω and ω′ ≤ N
2
.
Suppose the true state is 1, In the stationary distribution, we must have
δµ12ω
∑
ω′ 6=ω,ω′≤N
2
F 1(sω
′
) = µ12ω−1F
1(sω) for all ω ≤ N
2
,
δµ12ω−1F
1(sω
′
) = δµ12ω′−1F
1(sω) for all ω, ω′ ≤ N
2
and ω 6= ω′.
(E.3)
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Thus, when δ is close to 0, µ12ω−1 is close to 0 for all ω ≤ N2 . Moreover, we have
µ12 =
F 1(s1)
δ
∑
ω′ 6=1,ω′≤N
2
F 1(sω′)
× δF
1(s1)
δF 1(sω)
×
δ
∑
ω′ 6=ω,ω′≤N
2
F 1(sω
′
)
F 1(sω)
× µ12ω
=
I
N
2
− 1 ×I ×
(
N
2
− 2 + I
)
× µ12ω
=
I 2(N + 2I − 4)
N − 2 µ
1
2ω
(E.4)
for all ω 6= 1 and ω ≤ N
2
. We have
µ12 +
∑
ω 6=1,ω≤N
2
µ12ω = 1
µ12 +
N − 2
I 2(N + 2I − 4)
(
N
2
− 1
)
µ12 = 1
µ12 =
2I 2(N + 2I − 4)
2I 2(N + 2I − 4) + (N − 2)2 .
Repeating the same computation for all ω ≤ N
2
, the asymptotic utility equals:
N
2∑
ω=1
2I 2(N + 2I − 4)
2I 2(N + 2I − 4) + (N − 2)2 ×
1
N
=
I 2(N + 2I − 4)
2I 2(N + 2I − 4) + (N − 2)2 . (E.5)
The asymptotic utility of the ignorant updating mechanism, illustrated in figure 10,
is bigger than that of the non-ignorant updating mechanism, illustrated in figure 9,
if and only if:
I 2(N + 2I − 4)
2I 2(N + 2I − 4) + (N − 2)2 >
I
N + I − 1
I (N + 2I − 4)(N + I − 1) > 2I 2(N + 2I − 4) + (N − 2)2
I (N + 2I − 4)(N −I − 1) > (N − 2)2
N2(I − 1) +N(I 2 − 5I + 4) > 4 + I (2I − 4)(I + 1)
(N +
I − 4
2
)2 >
4 + I (2I − 4)(I + 1)
I − 1 +
(I − 4)2
4
(E.6)
which holds if and only if N is big enough as N + I−4
2
> 0 for N ≥ 4 and I > 1.
The intuition of the result is as follows: as the DM allocates two memory states
to each action, suppose the true state is state 1 and the DM is in memory state
2, it now takes at least 2 signals supporting the other states to induce a mistake.
Moreover, by focusing on only half of the states, the DM changes his memory states
only if he receives signals supporting the half of the states that he considers. These
two effects combined implies that the DM’s updating mechanism is less “noisy”,
which reduces the mistakes he makes among the states that he considers. When
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N increases, the second effect is stronger and the loss of ignoring half of the states
is smaller, as shown in equation (E.2). Thus, despite the fact that he is bound to
make mistakes under half of the states, the improvement in decision making under
the other half of the states is big enough that his average utility increases. This
example thus illustrates that even under a symmetric environment where all actions
and states are ex-ante identical, ignorant learning behavior could be optimal when
the environment is complex enough.
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